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Please find the revision resubmitted of a manuscript for Agricultural Systems for the 
Special Issue: Agricultural research for rural prosperity: Rethinking the pathways. The 
new title is Rapid transformation of Food Systems in Developing Regions: 
highlighting the role of agricultural research. The authors remain the same as original 
submission.
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things as well, and thus cut 5,000 words without changing all the main points of the 
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Responses to each Reviewer under the points, in bold. December 2, 2017
Relevant to all reviews: Overall, we cut 5,000 words from the text to make it tighter. 
Note that the text was not marked with the changes because we did such major cuts 
(5000 words) to the text while adding the material that we note below.
  -Reviewer 1
  - The authors are to be congratulated on having prepared a timely overview paper that 
succinctly synthesizes a wide set of existing studies of transformational change in food systems 
in Africa, Asia and Latin America. The comprehensive, multi-dimensional and cross-regional 
comparative framing make it a uniquely valuable contribution to the literature. Having said that, 
I believe that the manuscript can be significantly strengthened. In addition to a number of fairly 
minor modifications, additional work is required to ensure that the final paper maximizes it’s 
contribution to the existing literature and so that it’s contribution is more lasting. This can be 
done by broadening (and thereby updating its scope) to make it more forward looking and 
responsive to current debates. 
I organize my brief recommendations around four broad points: (1) scope, (2) additional 
analyses, (3) definitions, (4) typos.
Scope  
I strongly recommend that the authors incorporate consideration of a wider set of factors in their 
analysis, including: 
(a) Environmental impacts of the transformational changes (on soil, water, biodiversity, 
climate change.) For example, pg 23, ln 16 , longer supply chains are not only exposed to 
climate change-related shocks, but they also contribute to a larger carbon foot print. 
Similarly, in section 5.3, pg 35 and after, some recognition of the environmental costs of 
technological changes associated with intensification on water, soil and biodiversity 
would help round out that discussion. Other examples can be cited.
Response: We have added this to the performance/impacts section 6, so collected in 
one place under environment rubric. 
(b) Roles and effects of changes in the finance system on transformations across segments of 
the food system supply chain. This discussion would fit best in section 2 that addresses 
the “dendritic” nature of the food system. Timely, affordable and adequate financial 
flows, after all, are the lubricant and enabler of each of the system’s segments and thus 
require some discussion.
Response: We have added finance to both section 2 and to 
conduct/organization/institutions changes in section 5.2. 
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(c) Nutritional consequences of the food system transformations.  Changes in the output mix 
of the farm sector (e.g. pgs 13 and after), as well as rising consumption of processed 
foods have direct impacts on consumer health, including both malnutrition (lower 
nutrient dense diets) as well as obesity and diabetes. These negative impacts need to be at 
least referenced, and ways to mitigate these threats suggested. In the context of current 
global debates on nutrition, it is advised that a single reference to the non-communicable 
diseases (pg 47, lns 12-14) is grossly  inadequate.
Response: Nutrition effects have been added to section 6 on impacts/performance.
(d) Distributional and equity consequences of the transformations in both input and output 
markets (impacts on small farmers and poor consumers). The paper too often uses an 
“average” construct to describe major trends. However, because the welfare impacts on 
both farmers and consumers from any single transformational element are often 
diametrically different for different income classes, these should be addressed briefly or 
at least recognized, with references to related literature. Thus on pg 6 ln 7, the meta 
conditioners should include both income growth and distribution And on pg 13 section 
(c) it would be appropriate to include best estimates of how expenditure patterns vary 
across income groups, especially the lowest and highest deciles or quintile in both rural 
and urban areas. Similarly, on pg 21 lns 18-22, and pg 22, ln 8. 
Response: We especially add on the distributional/exclusion issues in section 6 on 
performance. In some other places, such as consumption changes, we highlight some 
surprises from recent empirical evidence showing diet transformation is widely 
distributed across income groups. 
While it would be unreasonable, and probably impractical, for the authors to go into great depth 
in each of these areas, at least some (preferably cited) reference to each of areas would 
demonstrate awareness of the issues and underline key functional relationships. 
It is also strongly recommended that the authors help frame and prioritize future research in these 
areas in their final section 7 (pg 49). 
Response: we have added in the implications section. 
Additional analyses
Pg 9, ln 18 and after. Provide best available estimates of income elasticities of demand by region 
and food group.
Response: Done.
Pg 11, lns 12-18. Provide possible explanations of anomalous results for West Africa regarding 
the increasing share of expenditure on grains. My assumption is that it reflects a shift from 
coarse grains to rice, but the authors should comment.
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Response: Agreed, added. 
Pg 14, lns 13-15. Recognize the rapid growth in rice production (and consumption) in Africa 
over the past three decades.
Response: Added. 
Pg 16, ln 17 and after. Expand discussion of productivity change beoynd production to include 
wider set of food system segments.
Response: We put this into the performance section 6 and conclusions section 7.
Pg 18, lns 13-15. If data is available, show how trends in consumption of imported foods differ 
between coastal and inland urban areas on Africa.
Response: While this is interesting in itself, we think that this detail is not essential 
to our focus and three-region breadth.
Pg 6, ln 21 and after, Pg 29, ln 18 and elsewhere. Need a much more substantial discussion of the 
specific policy and regulatory changes that have occurred in African, Asian and Latin American 
countries over time, and how these have enabled the multiple food system transformations. This 
is one of the weakest aspects of the current draft.
Response: All the reviews told us to cut the text substantially, saving on space 
wherever something is not essential to the basics of transformation and the 
implications for the research agenda. That is why we have kept the drivers of 
transformation, as opposed to the path of structure, conduct, and performance 
points, lean. We feel that we have already provided the lean points on the policy 
drivers, with respect to liberalization of internal and external trade and FDI, and 
privatization. Those are the essential drivers of the structure change to present. We 
have added some on the regulatory changes, in particular food safety and 
nutritional composition that will gradually become more substantial in the future. 
Pg 22 section (c) and elsewhere. Need greater discussion of the changing dynamics and potential 
of urban and peri-urban agriculture within the context of food systems transformation. There is 
only a single reference (pg 43, lns 6-7).
Response: We are striving to keep the discussion as lean as possible. Urban 
agriculture per se is both a tiny share of total agriculture now, and as a category 
does not change our basic structural discussion. Peri-urban agriculture is rural, just 
near the city, and we have added a qualifier on longer supply chains (the main trend 
now and for the next several decades in developing countries) to note that 
horticulture at present takes place in relatively short chains (but former periurban 
products, like chicken and fruit and fish, are produced at increasing distances with 
transport and storage technologies improving.)
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Pgs 31-33, section 5.1. Current draft places too much emphasis on imported technologies and 
largely ignores the wide number of successful new agricultural production technologies that have 
been developed by R&D conducted within the regions, including Africa.
Response: We have supplied examples from each of the three regions and a general 
point in section 5. 
Pg 34, lns 4-8. Need to acknowledge frequent negative impacts of consolidation in wholesale and 
retail markets serving urban areas in general and supermarkets in particular on small farmers in 
the absence of major institutional changes at the farm community level.
Response: We have added more on issue and occurrence of exclusion in the face of 
concentration in the supply chain, in section 6 on performance. 
Pgs 36-42. The flow of the paper seems to break here by departing from comparative analyses 
within the three regions to a review of anecdotal experiences from OECD (developed) country 
food and agriculture systems. Paper should retain its focus on a review of empirical evidence in 
Africa, Asia and L. America to make its points.
Response: Our focus is made more emphatically on developing regions examples, 
but we believe it is valuable and reinforces our points to show parallelism between 
the currently developed countries’ experience (when they were developing 
countries) and currently developing countries. This highlights the basic system 
phenomenon driving the changes, showing the specific context does not alter the 
logic of the sequence of change and the economic reasons for it. 
Pg 46, lns 4-10. The tautological argument is weak and unconvincing. Small farmers don’t 
necessarily benefit in the short and medium terms by increased volume of production. The Asian 
GR demonstrated this due to distorted input and land tenure systems, etc.  And with modern 
procurement systems demanding more timely, bulk and higher and more consistent quality of 
production, small farmers can also lose out in the short-term unless institutional innovations in 
farmer organizations are implemented. 
Response: These qualifications are noted in the part on what benefit and what 
challenge the volume increase per se has on farmers. Then we discuss quality 
requirements as an additional challenge. All of this is now more fully treated in the 
performance and impacts section, section 6.
Definitions
Pg 7, ln 18 and after. Need to define what constitutes an “urban” area more rigorously and across 
regions, taking into consideration, primary, secondary and tertiary cities and towns. It is 
impossible to understand the results presented without a clear definition of size and structure. A 
footnote would work.
Response: We added this in section 3.2. where urban shares are first discussed. 
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Pg 21, ln 1 and after. Define “rural” markets. 
Response: We added this in 4.3.2.b. where rural markets are first discussed. 
Pg 21, ln 10. Similarly, need for a definition of “middle class” across regions.
Response: We added this in the diet change section. 
Typos, lack of clarity
Response: We addressed these. 
Pg 1, lns 14 and 21. The first point includes the second.
Pg 4, ln 3. The word “that” is missing.
Pg 19, section 4.2.2.  3rd supply side impact is missing. List reads 1st, 2nd, 4th.
Pg 22, ln 15. Should read: “…supermarkets, urban traders….
Pg 31, lns 20-21. Should read: “…Key innovations in agricultural production technology….as 
well as in processing…”
Pg 45, ln 8. Sentence not clear.
Pg 45, ln 10. Delete word “study”.
 -Reviewer 2
This is a fantastic paper that brings together in one place a detailed set of evidence analysis about 
the recent and on-going transformations in global food systems.  I particularly enjoyed the way 
the paper illustrated the interconnectivity of technical and institutional innovations in different 
but obviously related value chain elements.  The recommendations for the research responses 
needed by NARS and IARCs are clear and even apparently simple, but have fundamental 
implications for historically patterned research capabilities and priorities.  Of the many things 
that I found pleasing was the demolishing of the food loss / waste myth (Martin Greeley’s 1980’s 
study on grain losses and the save grain campaign in India is an other (under used) example of 
debunking of this myth).
 Response: Thanks, this puts wind in our sails! And we added Greeley. 
On the other side of the leger, I wonder if something further could be said of the political 
economy of the transformation processes that are going.  The paper very clear states, towards the 
end, that it is the private sector that is in the driving seat – both large agribusiness firms and 
MSMEs.  I think this is correct.  However, what does this private sector led change really mean 
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for the directionality of the change process?  The paper suggests that it has been positive for 
small holder farmers and poorer urban consumers at the aggregate level.  However as Kaplinsky 
and other have noted the development of value chains tends to concentrate power at the expense 
of primary producers.  I guess my point here is that the performance of modern food systems 
needs to consider the way inclusion, nutrition and environmental sustainability performance is 
tracking.  Should public policy simply take a lazire fair approach and let the private sector 
proceed unshackled?  Or is this an approaching era where public policy needs to intervene once 
more to ensure that that directionality of performance is inline with, for example, the SDGs.  
What does this say about the governance of food system transformation going forward?  Might it 
start to look like self-regulation by the private sector on issues such as sustainability and ethical 
business practice (which there is some evidence of)?  What might the role of the public purse be 
in this context?  As a kind of related aside, a recent world bank publication, the Innovation 
Paradox,  makes the point that MSEM in developing countries don’t have the innovation 
capacity to absorb technical innovations from else where, therefore technology catch up is slower 
than expected.  In the food sector this might mean that sustainability facing innovations that are 
popping up in modern food systems might be slow to diffuse in transitioning systems unless 
public investments are made in building the innovation capacity of MSME.  Just a thought!
 Response: To reflect this, we build into section 6 on performance the issues of producer 
exclusion (both farmers and SMEs), and reference calls to address that, and 
nutrition/obesity issues on the consumption side, and reference calls for some type of 
regulation. 
Finally, a selfish point (as a semi-aridist).  The paper doesn’t mention the course grains, sorghum 
and millets.  I guess your analysis suggest that these will simply be replaced by maize, wheat and 
rice and drought tolerance etc can be improved in these for more arid areas, even in the face of 
climate change.  What would that imply for the performance of the food system in arid regions 
where the sorghums and millets have been historically important?  Are pulses a special case in 
India??
 Response: In the section on shifts in demand we have added the striking case of the rise of 
processed millet/sorghum in prepared dishes marketed for example in Senegal and Nigeria, 
a riposte for coarse grains in the convenience battle. We also added that in the SME 
proliferation part in the midstream discussion. 
In conclusion, a fantastic paper that I really enjoyed with perhaps some options for minor 
tweaks.
 Response: we are grateful. 
-Reviewer 3
  - 
I really enjoyed reading this paper for its informative narrative on changes in VCs. It explains 
how VCs have transformed in history (hence, the many references to USA, Europe). It does 
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also contain enough reference to developing countries to be relevant to the SI, but there the 
linkage to poverty reduction can be strengthened. I’d conclude that VC development can support 
small farmers, but most likely those who have the agency and resources to hop on board (hence, 
not likely those in a poverty trap) - correct?
Response: Agreed, and added/emphasized in/ to effects/performance part (where we note 
“actor incomes” but have made it fuller link to poverty reduction and poverty traps in the 
second paragraph of section 6 which treated your point but can be filled out to emphasize.
It paper needs a hard edit and some tighter focusing. 
Response: Hard-edited and cut substantially with (relative) focusing (although the terrain 
is broad per TOR).
Further points include:
 Title – Rapid transformation of Food Systems in Developing Regions: where agricultural 
research has and will contribute
Response: changed to this better title.
 Need an abstract
Response: Added.
 The ‘five interlinked transformations’ are a great framing and are conducive to research 
support … the paper needs to tick off on where such support has happened. Question 2 
promises to document the past contribution of research. 
Response: We have added in the introduction that research has especially aided the 
upstream transformation, in particular for grain yields and key inputs to that end. 
The further path of research will need to be quality and differentiation of output 
and midstream/downstream performance improvement, as well as system-wide 
issues like energy and resilience. 
 The early admission that “argumentation will need to rely on causal association by 
inference and cases” weakens the paper and the case for research contribution to post-
farm VC interventions. This paper needs to provide the case. 
Response: Revised the wording. The fact is we did as much as empirical base will 
allow. We had meant that the direct link, say of a specific technology breakthrough 
and a system transformation, is not a tight link but a general correlation. 
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 Or maybe make the argument that action research in VCs is essential because “evidence 
on the transformation of the off-farm segments of the food system is relatively limited 
and emerging and incomplete”
 Don’t cross reference special issue papers other than using normal referencing
Response: Done.
 Use of first person to mix represent five interlinked transformations of authors and 
research community. Probably better to use 3rd person.
Response: done. 
 Section 2, while helpful, can be removed to cut length; simply use a ref.
Response: There is no reference for this because to our knowledge there is no 
exposition of this point in the literature. But we cut it down significantly. 
 Section 4: Structural change in the food system, again is very interesting but can be cut in 
length significantly by stating the main trends (as per the sub-headings) and referring to 
references.
Response: Revised according to this point.
 Section 5 is the key to the paper in the context of the SI. This section needs to be less 
explanatory and use more referenced evidence.
Response: Revised according to this point. 
 Can remove the internal prefaces to sections (e.g. Section 5.3) “In this section we discuss 
the technology changes that occurred as the food system transformation occurred, and 
thus by extension the impact of technology research in IARCS and NARS and private 
companies on that transformation. We start with upstream, then look downstream. Within 
each, we start with commoditization-facilitation technologies (that get costs down), and 
then go to product differentiation-facilitation technologies (that help produce other 
attributes like quality and safety).”
Response: done. 
 Section 7 is very important for the SI. But it is too much a rehash summary of preceding 
sections and not enough in concluding what next for R&D, supported by references.
Response: we removed the summary and beefed up the implications discussion.
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Rapid transformation of Food Systems in Developing Regions:
Highlighting the role of agricultural research
1. Introduction 
The “food system” (the dendritic cluster of R&D value chains and the value chains linking 
input suppliers to farmers, and farmers upstream to wholesalers and processors midstream, to 
retailers then consumers downstream) has transformed enormously over the past 50 years. The 
most rapid change occurred only in the past 25 years. It shifted from being a traditional system to 
a mix of transitional and modern. From a historical perspective, the transformation was abrupt, 
not gradual. Reardon and Timmer (2014), illustrating with Asian evidence, explain the drivers as 
a confluence of “five interlinked transformations:” (1) Downstream demand side change 
“pulling” system transformation: (a) urbanization; (b) diet change; (2) Midstream/downstream 
change, “intermediating” system transformation: (c) change in retail, wholesale, logistics, and 
processing;  (3) Upstream change, “feeding” system transformation: (d) intensification of 
farming; (e) farm input supply chain change.  
Our paper extends the above work by comparing transformations, extending analysis to Africa 
and Latin America and updating analysis of Asia. We also extend the analysis to the role of 
agricultural research as a determinant of food system transformation. Here “agricultural 
research” includes both research on the inputs and farm segment (breeding, input design, 
agronomic practices, and so on) and research on the off-farm post-farm segments (on 
technologies and organization of processing, packaging, logistics, wholesale, retail).   
We address four questions: 
(1) How are food systems transforming?
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(2) How have research and non-research factors (urbanization, income growth, diet change, 
policies) influenced food system transformation? 
(3) What have been the effects of transformation on consumers and on small and medium 
farmers, as well as on system performance measures such as supply of affordable and safe 
and quality food, and efficiency and waste in the system? By chain-rule logical extension, 
we thus examine how research affects consumers and farmers via the “pathways” of food 
system transformation.
(4) What are the implications of the transformation for agricultural research strategies? 
Our findings lead to the two main messages of the paper. 
First, the research community, hitherto mainly focused on the farm segment of the system, 
needs to take into account the entire food system and its transformation in their research 
strategies. This will determine whether innovations in farm technology and products lead to 
profitable marketed output by farmers. Increasingly, the urban market, the food industry firms 
that mediate access to the urban market, input supply chains, and agribusiness firms that 
determine the development of input supply chains, set the market incentives and conditions for 
the affordability and profitability of new farm technologies, and thus their adoption. 
Second, the research community needs to understand and act on the importance of processing 
and logistics and wholesale (of outputs and inputs) in the food system, and research on these off-
farm components of the food system. Research on and productivity of technologies for input 
manufacture and output processing, packaging, logistics, and commerce have equal weight in the 
performance of the food system relative to the farm sector. Investment in research and 
development (R&D) for these off-farm segments needs a much higher profile in the context of 
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the transformed food system where off-farm segments occupy 40-70% of value added and costs 
of food. 
To address the research questions we face two challenges. First, unlike other pathways of the 
impacts of research on farmers and consumers, such as breeding research on farm yields, it is 
particularly complex to examine research impacts on food systems and thence on farmers and 
consumers. Research is just one of the conditioners of the transformation and its impacts. The 
emphasis must be put on discussing the transformation itself and positing impacts of research in 
combination with other factors (such as urbanization).  Second, as food system transformation in 
these regions is relatively recent, and the great majority of studies have been on the farm sector, 
empirical evidence on the transformation of the off-farm segments of the food system is only 
emerging and incomplete. We do our best to survey what is available.  
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 lays out a conceptual framework. Section 3 explores 
“downstream” drivers of food system transformation – urbanization, income growth, diet change, 
infrastructure investments, and policies. Section 4 examines trends in the transformation of the 
structure, and Section 5, in its conduct (including technology change). Section 6 discusses 
emerging evidence of the system’s performance. Section 7 presents implications for agricultural 
R&D strategies. 
2. The Food System as Dendritic
The food system can be thought of as “dendritic,” linking R&D, finance, input, and output 
supply chains, as follows.   
The first and “core” supply chain is the output value chain. An example from the rice system 
is an output value chain composed of rice farmers producing paddy, which is collected by rural 
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wholesalers or transporters and taken to mills where it is de-husked and polished. The rice is 
taken by wholesalers to urban wholesale markets and then to retailers.
The second and upstream “feeder” supply chains are the farm input supply chains, such as 
seed, fertilizer, farm equipment, labor, and arable land. These in turn are fed by input supply 
chains further upstream, such as the supply chain from phosphate mines to phosphoric acid 
plants to phosphate fertilizer factories. 
The third and downstream “feeder” supply chains are those supplying inputs to the post-
farmgate segments, in a sense “laterally.” An example is the truck and fuel supply chains to rice 
wholesalers. 
The fourth “pan-system feeder” supply chain is that supplying finance into every segment of 
every chain in the dendritic system. This can be formal or informal credit supply chains, or the 
most common in developing countries, own finance from retained earnings. 
The fifth “feeder” supply chain is a broad set of public assets apart from agricultural research 
institutions such as infrastructure, police protection, and court systems for contract enforcement.  
The sixth set of “feeders” is the R&D supply chains which supply technology and product 
innovations. For instance, companies and the National Agricultural Research System (NARS) 
and the International Agricultural Research Centers (IARCs) breed new seeds which feed seed 
supply chains which supply paddy farms. Moreover, universities and companies form public-
private partnerships that involve an emerging “educational-industrial complex” (Zilberman et al. 
2012) where innovation starts at university research centers and ideas are then further developed 
either by applied research centers (like the CGIAR and NARS) or by private sector entities 
(startups, small companies, and major corporations). The innovations in agricultural technology, 
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food processing, packaging, logistics, and so on that are supplied by R&D value chains are often 
powerful drivers of change in the other parts of the system.
The segments in each of the above value chains, and the six value chains themselves, are 
intertwined in “intersectoral (or intersegment) linkages.” An increase in demand or supply from 
one segment “induces” investment in another segment or chain (Hirschman, 1958). The induced 
investment can be in physical capital or hiring labor, but it can also be in the formation of an 
R&D supply chain: innovators (public or private) cum entrepreneurs design and market new 
technologies or new products to meet demand in other value chains. For example, if supermarket 
chains demand shelf-stability in vegetable varieties they contract to procure, innovators can 
endogenously implement a vegetable breeding innovation to breed a shelf stable variety, as 
derived demand from farmers wishing to supply the supermarket chain.   
But seen from the perspective of a given food system, there can be exogenous R&D 
“investment” that is not induced by factor scarcity or attribute demand in that food system. The 
R&D supply chain may endogenously arise in another context (another country, another product, 
etc.) and then present a technological innovation “exogenously” to the given food system. An 
example is the creation and manufacture of extruders for feed processing in the US. It might then 
be transferred to Bangladeshi feed mills using imported machines embodying this innovation. 
This would give the importer a competitive advantage and perhaps induce concentration in the 
feed supply chain in Bangladesh. 
 
3. Transformation of Food Systems: downstream and context drivers
3.1. Meta conditioners: Income growth, policy liberalization, and infrastructure investment
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There are three “meta conditioners” that encouraged and facilitated nearly all the 
transformations we discuss.  
First, growth in income and population in the three regions was crucial as a pull factor. 
Incomes rose, especially starting in the 1980s in Latin America and Asia outside the transition 
countries (China, Vietnam, and India) and 1990s in Africa and the Asian transition countries. 
Income growth, along with increasing opportunity cost of time as women worked outside the 
home in urban and rural areas, led to diet and shopping changes discussed below.
Second, policy liberalization and privatization occurred during the 1980s and 1990s (from the 
transitions in China and Vietnam, to the de-reservations in India, to structural adjustment 
programs in all three regions). This led to a minimization of governments’ direct role in food 
systems. It also increased private sector MSMEs (micro, small, and medium enterprises) that 
stepped into the void left by parastatals, with MSME proliferation encouraged by the expanding 
urban markets. The policy changes also led to entry of large-scale domestic and foreign firms 
such as processors and supermarket and fast food chains, as well as large input firms. The 
massive ingress of foreign companies was abetted by liberalization of the once-ubiquitous 
foreign direct investment (FDI) regulations in the 1980s-2000s. 
Third, governments instituted large infrastructure programs in Asia and Latin America in the 
1980s and 1990s and in some African countries (e.g. Ethiopia, Minten et al., 2014b) in the early 
2000’s. This reduced transaction costs and formed the foundation for food supply chain 
development from rural areas to the burgeoning cities and towns. 
3.2. Urbanization  
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In a traditional situation, the urban share of the population is low. Supply chains are mainly 
short and local, serving villages and nearby towns. But as urbanization occurs, supply chains 
must stretch out from the cities and grow longer as the city needs a larger and larger catchment 
area to feed itself. Some fresh produce and chickens and aquaculture may be produced in peri-
urban areas (rural areas near towns), but less perishable products such as grains and roots/tubers 
are produced far from cities and brought in. Even horticulture products and chicken and milk are 
increasingly produced far from cities as processing - such as vegetable freezing and ultra-high 
temperature milk processing - are located far from cities where production costs are lower 
(Reardon, 2015). 
Urbanization has indeed been occurring, and quickly, in all three of the regions. Latin 
America’s urbanization was earliest, with the urban share roughly 40% in 1950, 55% in 1970, 
65% by 1990, and 75% by 2010 (UN, 2014). Asia’s urban share was only 20% in 1960, rising to 
45% on average by 2011, and projected to 60% by 2025 (UN, 2011).  Africa had a 40% urban 
population share by 2011, up from 24% in 1970 and projected to average 48% by 2030 (UN, 
2011).  The latter figure masks heterogeneity between countries; for instance, the urban share in 
Nigeria is 50% by 2015 (Bloch et al., 2015). 
Moreover, the urban food market is in fact the majority food market on average in the three 
regions. This is because urban areas have higher incomes than rural areas (e.g., in ESA, Eastern 
and Southern Africa not including South Africa, urban income per capita is double that of rural; 
Tschirley et al., 2015), enough so to overwhelm the negative relation of income and overall food 
budget share noted by Engel’s Law. In an Asian study of Bangladesh, Nepal, Indonesia, and 
Vietnam, Reardon et al. (2014b) show that while 38% of the population is urban, 53% of food 
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consumption is urban. Even in the poorest region, ESA, 26% of the population is urban but cities 
consume 48% of food produced and sold (Dolislager et al., 2015). 
To feed the cities, rural-urban supply chains have grown rapidly. Haggblade (2011) estimates 
this growth at 600-800% over three decades for Africa; Reardon and Timmer (2014) have it at 
roughly 1000% in Southeast Asia in the same period.  
3.3.  Diet change  
3.3.1. Rise in the share of non-cereals  
As incomes rise, “Bennett’s Law” (Bennett, 1954) predicts a shift toward a higher proportion 
of non-staples in the diet. At a system level, this means that with development (which we 
roughly proxy by GDP per capita), one expects disproportionate growth of the supply chains of 
non-staples such as vegetables and fruit, meat and fish, dairy, and edible oils. Table 1 shows this 
with macro data from FAOSTAT for 1970 to 2013 with shares of tons of consumption-by-
disappearance.   
For Africa, the share of cereals inched down from 28% to 26%, roots/tubers stayed stable at 
around 20%, and non-staples rose from 50 to 55%. There was however some composition 
change in cereals consumption especially in West Africa toward rice, discussed below. 
For Asia, the non-staples rise was more dramatic: cereals were 40% in 1970, inched down to 
37% by 1990, and then dropped to only 24% by 2013. Timmer et al. (2010) use macro data on 
rice to show that in most Asian countries there has been a stagnant trend in rice consumption per 
capita, and even in some cases a gradual decline. Roots/tubers moved from 15% to only 3% over 
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the period. By contrast, the striking winner in the diet was non-staples, soaring from 46% to 
74%.
Latin American diet composition changed less during the period compared to the other two 
regions. This could be because a considerable part of Latin America’s rapid development 
occurred in the 1960s-1970s, two decades earlier than most of Africa and Asia. Even by 1970 
staples were only 30% of Latin American consumption, and that share had only dropped to 24% 
by 2013, and non-staples to 76%, like Asia.   
Recent micro level survey data on household food expenditures corroborate the above macro 
figures. 
For Asia, Reardon et al. (2014b) analyzed household survey data (LSMS) from 2010 and 
found that that for South Asia (Nepal and Bangladesh) and Southeast Asia (Indonesia and 
Vietnam), the share of cereals (mainly rice) in the food budget in value terms was about 26% for 
urban and 37% for rural households on average. Interestingly, the poorest tercile was only a little 
higher: 37% for urban and 47% for rural areas. Despite average income differences between the 
South Asian sample and the Southeast Asian sample, they found the shares of cereals in urban 
food budgets were similar (29% in South Asia and 23% in Southeast Asia). Meat and fish 
averaged 30% of the urban budget – itself equal to the grain share. Horticulture products 
averaged 15%. Together meat/fish and horticulture average 45%, more than grains all together. 
Another study showed similar results for India: Indiastat (2010) showed that the share of cereal 
in the urban diet (in value terms) dropped from 36% in 1972 to 23% in 2006, and in the rural 
diet, from 56% to 32%. 
It may come as a surprise that African findings from LSMS analysis do not differ sharply 
from Asia’s. For ESA urban and rural areas, Dolislager et al. (2015) found for Malawi, Tanzania, 
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Uganda, and Zambia, that the share of grains (mainly maize) in urban food expenditure (in value 
terms) was 34%, and rural, 39%. The share of non-grains in urban food expenditure was 66%, 
and rural, 61%. As in Asia, they found the patterns for the poor stratum were not that different 
from the other strata. 
For West Africa urban areas, Hollinger and Staatz (2015) analyzed data from urban food 
expenditure studies. Where the main staples are grains alone (Burkina Faso, Mali, and Senegal), 
they found that the share of grains in diets in value terms increased some over several decades: 
from 33 to 38%, and 62% of expenditure is on non-grains. Animal products and fish are the 
foremost items in this set: in the 2000s they formed a quarter of the total. Fruits/vegetables 
average another 12% (compare that with 16% in Asia and the US). Meat plus horticulture 
products equal grain expenditure in the urban Sahel. They found that for the countries where 
grains plus roots/tubers are the staples (Cote d’Ivoire, Ghana, and Nigeria), the share of grains 
dropped from 27 to 23% and tubers/roots rose from 14 to 17% over the 1990s to the 2000s. The 
share of non-staples (neither grains nor roots/tubers) was about 60%.  Again meat/fish was found 
to be 21% of expenditure, and horticulture products, 17%: together (38%) they have nearly the 
share of staples (grains and roots/tubers), 40%.
3.3.2. Shift of the diet toward (purchased) processed products
Research in the 1980s-1990s examined the incipience of processed food purchase in 
developing regions, driven by a new era of income increases and emerging urbanization and the 
rise of rural nonfarm employment. Processed food began to be sought as a time-saver for women 
whose opportunity cost of time increased as they entered the labor force outside the home in 
urban and rural areas, in Latin America (e.g., Amat y Leon and Curonisy, 1981, Peru); Asia (e.g., 
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Senauer et al., 1986, Sri Lanka); and Africa (e.g., Bricas and Muchnik, 1985 for West Africa; 
Kennedy and Reardon, 1994 for East Africa). 
There has been a revival of interest in processed foods in developing regions in the 2000s. 
This occurred with the confluence of (1) urbanization and increased incomes; (2) easing of 
import of processed foods; (3) FDI and domestic investment in processing following 
liberalization and privatization. 
In Africa, processed foods have penetrated both rural and urban markets. In the ESA study of 
Tschirley et al. (2015), 56% of urban household, and 29% of rural household food expenditures 
(in value terms) went to processed foods. Some half to two-thirds of processed foods are low-
processed, like packaged flour or noodles and bread. These are usually domestic products and 
time-savers for women. More processed packaged foods are usually a mix of domestic products 
and imports. For Nigeria, Liverpool-Tasie et al. (2017) found that while imported processed 
goods dominate in numbers of types of products, they are a minority in retail volume terms. Of 
course, a number of these products depend at least partially on imported raw materials such as 
flavorings, wheat, and milk powder. 
In Asia, Pingali (2006) noted a “Westernization” of diets with packaged convenience foods 
emerging. Reardon et al. (2014b) (for the Asian countries noted op cit.) found that urban 
households dedicate 73% of food expenditures to processed foods, and rural households, 60%. 
Surprisingly, the penetration of processed food did not differ much over income terciles in the 
African and Asian consumption analyses. Women in poorer and richer households are pressed 
for time working out of the home in rural nonfarm employment and urban jobs, and the quest for 
convenience in processed foods instead of laborious home processing characterizes both. 
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3.3.3. Shift of the Product Composition among grains
First, the surge in demand for livestock products has translated into the precipitous rise of 
demand for maize as a feed grain. A striking example is in China: maize (mainly for feed) had 
been half of the tonnage of rice in 1993 but by 2013 overtook rice (Zheng, 2013). In Bangladesh, 
aquaculture grew 25-fold in three decades (nearly all for the domestic market), spurring a 
massive rise in the feed industry and demand for maize and other feed grains (Hernández et al., 
2017). Liverpool-Tasie et al. (2016) found in Nigeria that the maize-based feed industry grew 
600% in the past decades as derived demand from the booming aquaculture and chicken sectors. 
Second, the rise of demand for convenience foods by consumers has as a derived demand a 
rapid rise in wheat and rice. In Asian areas where rice traditionally reigned, wheat has made 
inroads in the form of noodles and bread (Senauer et al. 1986, for Sri Lanka; Pingali, 2006, for 
Asia overall). Timmer (2015) shows for Southeast Asia that wheat imports rose from 1 million 
tons in 1961 to 13 million by 2010, and wheat consumption from 2.8% to 11.5% that of rice. 
In West Africa where millet and sorghum and tubers are the traditional staples, rice and wheat 
have rapidly increased with the drivers noted above (Reardon, 1993). While rice doubled in tons 
of domestic production in ECOWAS over 1987 to 2009, domestic rice output stayed at about 55-
60% of self-sufficiency, and imports of cereals (mainly rice) soared from 1 billion to 5 billion 
dollars in those two decades (Hollinger and Staatz, 2015). There has been a recent surge in 
commercialization of prepared and packaged millet dishes in rural areas so coarse grains may be 
making a significant convenience riposte. 
In East Africa, the rise of wheat consumption has also been driven by convenience food 
demand (Kennedy and Reardon, 1994). Wheat consumption in West Africa has also started to 
rise not just via the half century old luxury of bread for the middle class, but now as cheap fast 
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noodles and bread and bean sandwiches for the poor. An example is the rapid spread of the 
Indonesian multinational Indofood’s “indomie”, a packaged (wheat) ramen noodle, produced by 
Indofood FDI in Nigeria (cooked often with egg, and thus a fillip to egg consumption) 
(Liverpool-Tasie et al., 2016b). 
Third, in a number of countries there is a shift toward higher quality grains, such as finer rice 
in Bangladesh. In Ethiopia, there is a shift away from the cheap red teff to the more expensive 
and preferred white teff. This increasing shift in intra-cereal demand drives changes in the 
portfolio of farmers as well as changes in the milling sector (Minten et al., 2013, 2016).
4. Transformation of food systems – focus on structure  
4.1. Stages of structural change
There has been a lot of variation in the timing of take-off and speed of transformation of food 
systems across products, regions, countries within regions, and zones within countries. In general 
the transformation is over three stages of structure and conduct change.
(a) The least advanced stage is the “traditional” system. This tends to be spatially short 
(“local”) and fragmented in structure, using technologies with little capital and much labor, 
with no contracts or formal standards, and spot markets linking all segments. 
(b) The next stage is the “transitional.” It is spatially long (as cities grow and their catchment 
area is larger and larger) but still fragmented. Chain actors use a mix of labor-intensive and 
capital-intensive technologies. There are emerging public standards of quality. But still spot 
market relations dominate. 
(c)The most advanced stage is “modern.” It is usually spatially long. But it is consolidating in 
various segments (such as in retail, the rise of supermarkets). There is also some “dis-
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intermediation” such as supermarkets buying directly from processors, or urban wholesalers 
directly from farmers. Private standards are emerging, and some use of contracts. Capital 
intensification is common as the modern stage tends to coincide with higher wages in the 
economy. More quality and safety control are demanded by the food industry.
There have been waves of diffusion of food system transformation over space and products in 
the developing regions. 
The spatial waves are as follows (Reardon and Timmer, 2012).   
(a)The first wave included East Asia outside China (such as South Korea) and South America 
such as Brazil, with transformation taking off in the 1980s. 
(b)The second wave was in Mexico and Central America and in parts of South America (such 
as Colombia, Chile), Southeast Asia outside “transition” countries, and South Africa (with the 
take-off starting in the 1990s).  
(c)The third wave, taking off mainly in the 2000s, includes the “transition” countries, China, 
Vietnam, and India, and South American countries “catching up” such as Peru and Bolivia.  
(e) The fourth wave, in the 2000s, includes parts of Africa especially in southern (Zambia) 
and eastern Africa (Kenya) and emerging in West Africa such as in Nigeria, Ghana, and Senegal. 
The product waves are as follows. The grain value chains transform earliest, animal products 
next, and fresh fruits and vegetables last. (These waves are similar to the pattern of diffusion of 
change in Europe and US food systems earlier.)
4.2.  Dimensions of structural change 
4.2.1. Expansion
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Food volumes grew a lot from 1970 to now with the steepest increase from 1990 to 2013 (the 
latest year in FAOSTAT). This pattern roughly tracks the path of “economic development” or 
average income growth. Table 1 shows “food supply quantities” from FAO food balance sheets 
for 1970, 1990, and 2013. These are measures of “domestic consumption by disappearance” per 
capita, calculated starting with aggregate production, adding imports, and deducting disposal of 
the output (exports, waste, storage for the next year, and use as seed). We then use their 
population data to derive aggregate consumption by disappearance per region. This is a rough 
measure as it is only in physical terms, not value or nutrition terms. A physical measure probably 
underestimates growth in value terms as non-staples and processed foods, which grew the fastest, 
have higher prices on average than grains or roots/tubers. But our goal here is not fine precision 
but orders of magnitude and key trends. Several points emerge.
First, in 43 years, the total “food system” in these three regions grew from 1.3 to 5 billion 
tons, 4-fold, faster than population grew (from 2.6 to 6.5 billion, 2.5 fold). Interestingly, the 
trends did not differ much over the three regions. Africa’s food volume expanded 1.8 times in the 
first two decades and then 2.1 times in the following 25 years, hence 3.8 times over 43 years. 
Asia’s total food supply rose 1.8 times in the first 20 years and then 2.1 times in the next 25 
years, for overall growth of 3.8 times. Latin America’s rose 1.7 times in the first 20 years and 
then 1.7 times in the next 25 years, for overall growth of 2.8 times.   
Mirroring demand changes, output per category grew overall, but with relative gains for non-
staples over the four decades – in Africa, 340% in cereals volume, 400% in non-staples; in Asia, 
220% in cereals, 590% in non-staples; in Latin America, 230% in cereals, and 300% in non-
staples.  
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Second, imports as a share of food supply (net of exports) have risen, but are still minor. In 
Africa, tons of imports rose 11 times over the 43 years – from 7% to 15% to 21% of 
consumption by disappearance. In Asia, they rose 7 times and went from 9% to 13% to 18% of 
total consumed tons. In Latin America, they rose 7 times, and went from 3% to 6% to 9% of 
consumption. Import growth occurred steadily over the whole half century; it was in the policy 
debate in Africa in the 1980s/1990s (see Reardon, 1993) and has continued in the debate in the 
2000s (African Development Bank, 2016). 
Third, agricultural exports, while often important in policy debates, are small compared with 
the domestic food system. In Africa, these reached 7% of the level of domestic consumption; in 
Asia, 10%; in Latin America, 22%. It was especially in Latin America that exports rose in the 
well-known story of its agricultural export success in the globalization period.
4.2.2. Elongation
(a) Growth of rural to urban food supply chains
When the urban share was low, supply chains were short, with farmers feeding themselves 
and local villages and towns. As the urban share rose, and the cities grew, supply chains 
stretched further and further to fulfill the enormous needs of the cities. As domestic supply 
chains surge to feed cities, several points stand out.
First, seen from the countryside, most food goes to cities. As noted above, roughly 50-75% of 
domestic food supply now goes to cities; in the 1970s it was but 20-30% depending on the 
region. Even in the least urbanized and poorest region, ESA, 46% of cereal consumption (home-
consumed by farmers and purchased by rural and urban households) is consumed in urban areas; 
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61% of purchases of cereal, 52% of fruit and vegetables, 58% of meat and fish, and 63% of 
edible oils are consumed in urban areas (Reardon et al., 2014d). 
Second, the product categories output growth plus the rise in the share of urban consumption 
in total national consumption both noted above together yield the result that one can double or 
triple the product category volume growth rates to get a rough idea of how much the volume of 
rural-to-urban supply chains increased over 45 years. For instance, for Africa, this means that 
non-staple rural-urban supply chains increased about 800 to 1000% (depending on the sub 
region). That figure is about 1800% for non-staples in Asia. These enormous climbs represent a 
major investment by actors along the supply chain from farmers to urban retailers and 
wholesalers. 
 
(b) Growth of Rural-to-rural and urban-to-rural supply chains
Even rural consumer markets are developing fast.
First, in Africa over three decades, rural population grew from 0.37 billion in 1970 to 1.05 
billion in 2011 (UN, 2011); in Asia, from 2.1 billion in 1970 to 4.2 billion in 2011. The increase 
in the rural market in value terms is greater than population growth shows, for in many areas 
rural incomes have grown over several decades, albeit with regional variation. Even in the 
poorest regions, a rural middle class has emerged; Tschirley et al. (2015) demonstrate that 55% 
of the middle class in the ESA is in rural areas. 
Second, rural purchases of food are now substantial. The traditional situation was one of farm 
households being either self-sufficient or buying a little of their food. While Mellor (1976) in 
India and Reardon et al. (1988) in Africa pointed out that many rural households, even farmers, 
were net buyers of grains, the share of total consumption from purchases was on average 
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traditionally low. This of course differed by semi-arid versus more humid areas, such as in 
Senegal, where purchases of food were important for the drought prone areas and much less 
important in the relatively lush areas (Kelly et al., 1993).
But recent data show high shares of purchased food in rural diets in Africa and Asia. In ESA, 
Dolislager et al. (2015) show rural households bought 44% (in value terms) of food they 
consume; Liverpool-Tasie et al. (2016b) show 70% in Nigeria. Sibhatu and Qaim (2017) show 
that 42% of calories consumed of rural Ethiopian households are from purchased foods. In the 
Reardon et al. (2014b) Asian study, rural households purchase share averaged 73%. Third, recent 
evidence shows these purchases are mainly financed by rural nonfarm employment (RNFE) as 
well as by agricultural product sales. Very little is purchased on credit, whether from informal or 
formal sources (Adjognon et al., 2017, for Africa). RNFE is roughly 40% of rural household 
incomes in Africa and Asia, and a much higher share of total cash available, and far higher than 
migration income or credit flows (Haggblade et al., 2007).  
(c) Challenges to farmers from longer supply chains
There are challenges for farmers of longer supply chains, with urban markets becoming the 
main markets faced by farmers. 
First, in longer supply chains, small farmers face more competition. Urban traders seek a 
diverse set of zones to reduce seasonality and supply risk. They have the logistics and purchasing 
power to require that different regions compete for their procurement. This means that farmers 
from a given zone no longer have a “protected” (by transaction cost barriers) local market but are 
competing with farmers large and small from other zones for the urban market. 
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Local farmers also vie with imports for city markets. But local farmers and rural processing 
enterprises have even to vie with cheap packaged processed foods from urban areas coming into 
rural areas, often via the conduit of secondary city/rural town markets (Reardon et al., 2007b). 
An example is Indofoods’ packaged noodles and drinks into rural towns in Indonesia and Nigeria 
(Liverpool-Tasie et al., 2017), or Maseca’s ready-made tortillas or mix coming into rural towns 
in Mexico (Rello, 1996). 
Second, as urban markets modernize with the rise of supermarkets (discussed below), the 
competition by a region for supplying to urban supermarket procurement centers heightens, and 
becomes more challenging yet with the imposition of private grades and standards. Reardon et al. 
(2007) and Berdegue et al. (2005) illustrate this for the cases of Mexico and Central America. 
Large processing firms and supermarkets based in towns also tend to prefer supply regions with 
low transaction costs, and eschew contracting with farmers in hinterland zones (Barrett et al., 
2012).  
Third, longer supply chains mean heightened vulnerability to shocks that beset long exposed 
chains – shocks of climate change (Reardon and Zilberman, 2017), energy cost spikes, disease 
outbreaks, food safety crises, and sociopolitical strife. A case in point is the vulnerability to all 
these represented by the south-north and north-south maize and egg supply chains in Nigeria 
(Liverpool-Tasie et al., 2016). 
4.2.3. Change in “industrial organization” structure of the system 
a) Increase in the “post-farmgate” segments
In a local traditional short supply chain, very little of the value added of the chain is due to 
off-farm components of the supply chain – the midstream (wholesalers, logistics agents, 
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processors) and downstream (retailers). The farmer sells the grain or milk to neighbors and 
transports it herself. The consumer buys the raw product and processes it herself. 
As the chain grows longer, the market volume grows large enough, and economies of 
specialization emerge in the midstream and downstream segments, the off-farm components’ 
shares rise compared with traditional chains. Typically the farmer’s share in the total value added 
of the supply chain drops as the counterpart to post-farmgate segments’ development. Reardon 
(2015) reviewed evidence and produced a rough estimate for Asia and Africa food supply chains 
of about 40% of value added from farms, 40% from midstream (what he calls the “hidden 
middle” as this segment is usually ignored in both policy debates and research) and 20% from 
the downstream. This share varies over products and regions.
b) Emergence of a “Quiet Revolution” of small off-farm food system enterprises 
As supply chains develop to cities, and gradually consumers purchase processed products, 
there is a proliferation of midstream MSMEs in wholesale and processing, as well as upstream in 
input supply. This is part of the “transitional stage” and is the dominant situation now in Africa 
and South Asia. Recent studies in South Asia, China, Vietnam, and Africa have termed this a 
“Quiet Revolution” wherein tens of thousands of MSMEs emerge (Minten et al., 2010; Reardon 
et al., 2012b, 2014c). Four examples intrigue. 
First, there has been a rapid emergence of MSME potato cold storages in Bihar (Minten et al., 
2014) and Western Uttar Pradesh near Delhi (Das Gupta et al., 2010). The storages diffused due 
to a confluence of trends – the rise of nearby cities, the improvement of road links and electricity 
grids, the introduction of a disease-resistant and long-shelf-life potato varieties by the NARS, 
and a flood of private investments by local small/medium entrepreneurs.
20
Second, there has been a proliferation of SME “outsourced agricultural services”. Examples 
include SME providing mobile combine services for small rice farmers in China (Zhang et al., 
2017) and Myanmar (Belton 2017). There has also been a diffusion of “sprayer trader” services 
in mango areas of Indonesia and the Philippines: teams of skilled laborers equipped with 
sprayers and vehicles and ladders go from farm to farm and prune, spray, harvest, sort, and 
market mangoes for small and medium farmers targeting demanding urban and export markets 
(dela Cruz et al., 2010; Qanti et al., 2017). 
Third, Minten et al. (2016) show that the value chain of teff (the leading cereal in Ethiopia) 
has developed rapidly over the past decade. There has been a proliferation of MSME mills-cum-
retailers, wholesale, and logistics firms spurred by Addis’s development and road improvements. 
The development of the teff value chain is in turn correlated with increasing adoption of modern 
inputs by farmers, and shift from cheap red varieties to the more expensive, higher quality white 
teff varieties and uptake of improved varieties of the latter. 
Fourth, in Senegal in the past decade, the millet supply chain has rapidly transformed with the 
emergence of processed and prepared millet products. Badiane (2016) shows that this 
transformation has featured the development by small female-headed enterprises of branded 
packaged millet and millet-cum-dairy products for the Dakar market. 
c) Concentration and dis-intermediation
As markets expand with longer supply chains, and especially where there are economies of 
scale or economies of scope, such as in processing or retail procurement and storage, and large-
scale firms are more efficient than small firms, segment concentration tends to occur. Some 
segments of a chain may concentrate while others stay fragmented for some time. For example, 
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in the dairy sector in Zambia, some small farms sell to large processors who sell some of their 
output to supermarkets (Neven et al., 2016). In the Bangladesh rice sector, town-based larger 
wholesalers have competed out of the market many small rural brokers, but the wholesalers sell 
on to many small urban millers and small retailers (Minten et al., 2013). 
Reardon (2015) conceives of the evolution of concentration as a “J curve” with three stages.
The first stage in many developing countries has been the establishment of government grain 
retail and wholesale parastatals to serve emerging urban markets, building economies of scale as 
a counter to the traditional fragmented supply chain, and to obviate what governments perceived 
as “exploitative traders.” This is the leftmost part of the J of concentration over time. 
The second stage occurs after market liberalization and the privatization of the parastatals. 
The vacuum thus left attracts investments at least initially by many MSMEs. This is the bottom 
of the J curve; it can be broad or narrow depending on how long the MSMEs can hold out 
against competition or acquisition by large private firms.
The third stage is the steep rightmost part of the J, and is the re-concentration that occurs after 
competition thins the ranks of MSMEs and large firms emerge to outcompete or buy the small 
firms. The emergence is usually spurred by FDI liberalization as seen in Latin America in the 
1980s/1990s and domestic investment regulation relaxation (such as “de-reservation” in India in 
the late 1990s.  The large firms arise at first in the midstream and downstream (processing, 
wholesale/logistics, retail, and fast-food) and later in upstream (seed, chemical, and machine 
agribusiness firms) (Reardon et al. 2003 for supermarkets; Reardon and Timmer, 2012 for 
processing and wholesale; Popkin and Reardon, 2017 for fast food). Supermarkets in Central 
America have shifted to buying directly from agribusiness firms for crops in which the latter are 
engaged (e.g., pineapples, bananas) (Berdegué et al., 2005). 
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Also, large scale firms in different segments facilitate each other’s growth through 
“coevolution.” To reduce transaction costs and make sure private standards are met, supermarket 
chains tend to source from large processors. An example of this is supermarket chains in China 
sourcing mainly from large rice mills (Reardon et al., 2014c). Large processors target product 
differentiation to the requests of supermarkets, such as for milk and juice products by Nestle in 
Brazil (Farina et al., 2005). Large logistic and wholesale multinationals as well as processors 
“follow” supermarket chains into new countries, in “follow sourcing”, as with Baakavor 
following Tesco into China (Reardon et al., 2007b). 
Furthermore, large firms have a tendency to try to “cut out the intermediaries” and sell or buy 
directly – “disintermediation.” This is done mainly to cut costs, as well as control quality or 
assure traceability. For example, larger wholesalers based in towns and cities have in India gone 
well along the path of eliminating use of traditional village brokers in order to buy directly from 
rice and potato farmers (Reardon et al., 2012b). 
Finally, supermarkets and processing companies also have a tendency for “re-intermediation” 
- to shift from procurement on the traditional fragmented spot market to use, as much as possible, 
specialized, dedicated wholesalers to procure and market (Reardon and Berdegué, 2002). They 
are charged with applying quality and safety standards of the chains or processor, selecting 
regular suppliers such as farmers or supplier villages or coops who can meet the standards, and 
collecting or marketing exclusively for the chain or processor. An example is large rice millers in 
China relying on specialized agents to wholesale their branded packaged rice (Reardon et al., 
2012b), and supermarkets in Latin America and Africa and China using dedicated wholesalers to 
source produce according to the private quality standards of the chains (Reardon and Berdegué, 
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2002 for Latin America, Weatherspoon and Reardon, 2003 for Africa, and Hu et al., 2004 and 
Michelson et al., 2017 for China).
 
5. Transformation of Food systems: focus on conduct 
5.1. Endogenous transfer, co-evolution, and innovators’ strategic system design
Many basic industrial and agricultural innovations were generated in the past 200 years since 
the British industrial revolution (itself partly based on the earlier Chinese innovation of 
horizontal loom, Braudel, 1979), and the subsequent agriculture technology and food system 
revolutions in the US and Western Europe. In particular in the past 100 years food system 
technology innovations emerged (often the fruit of machine engineering and chemistry linked to 
the industrial revolution) in the US and Western Europe. These were two way drivers in the food 
system transformation in these two regions.  These technology innovations were in agriculture 
(such as chemical fertilizer, hybrid maize, tractors, pesticides, genetic modification, and so on), 
in processing and wholesale and transport (motorized mills, trucks, refrigeration, freeze drying, 
and so on), and in market organization and communication (chain stores, self-service retail, 
supermarkets, private standards, ICT).
Many of the food system innovations from the US and Western Europe were then transferred 
and adapted in developing Asia, Africa, and Latin America in the past 50 years in the system 
transformation waves as demand side and policy conditions grew receptive and propitious for 
their transfer. The channels of transfer included: (1) massive waves of foreign direct investment 
(FDI) by agribusiness, processors, logistics and wholesale, and retailers; (2) investments by local 
entrepreneurs and public sector in innovations from the US or Western Europe they observed in 
FDI activities or on a business trip or university education, or read about on the internet. 
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The local private entrepreneurs and public sector in developing countries as well as 
innovating “Western” companies diffused those initial innovations, adapting and modifying them 
to local conditions. Just as in the “West” the initial innovations had developed as packages of 
inter-dependent innovations (such as the example of Tyson with genetic variation, contracting, 
private standards, piecing and cooling or freezing, long distance transport, and marketing in 
supermarkets), the transfer of one or more innovations, in technology or organization, brought 
with it the cluster of other related innovations both in technology and products, and in market 
organization.
Of course, not all of the basic innovations during the past 50 years were transferred initially 
from the “West.” There was a wave of technology innovations, some basic and new and others 
applications and adaptations of prior innovations generated in international research institutes 
based in developing countries (such as IRRI’s developed of modern varieties of rice in the 1960s 
in the Philippines, David and Otsuka, 1994) and in the large NARS in the developing regions. 
Examples include the foundational work in rice varieties in Taiwan and Japan in the 1920s-1930s 
and China and India in the 1950s-1970s (Barker and Herdt with Rose, 1985) and Argentina and 
Brazil (for no-till cropping technology innovation in the 1960s-1970s, see Trigo et al., 2009). In 
other NARS, there was significant adaptation work done that amounted to innovation in 
application, such as the Zaria maize work cited below.   
Technology and product innovations are not “neutral” in their impact on the structure and 
conduct of food systems. The impact itself is often endogenous to the deliberate system designs 
of the innovator, as argued by Zilberman et al. (2017). They examine the proactive links between 
innovators’ innovations and their “implementation,” to generate and protect an initial advantage 
and profit arising from the innovation’s superiority (in cost or quality or safety) to the technology 
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or product it supplants. They depict as endogenous the structure and the conduct of the supply 
chain based on that innovation.  
In that sense then, the food system changes we observe, especially in the modern phase, are 
emanations of the strategies of innovating companies. These strategies are sets of technologies 
and institutions and organizations chosen to implement the innovations. But they also “induce” 
innovation in other companies to “co-evolve” and help (symbiotically) the initial innovators 
implement the innovation. An example of this is given below of co-evolution of Nestle and 
Tetrapak investments in the Brazilian dairy industry. 
Understanding both the role of public research and private innovators, and the linkages 
between technological, organizational, and institutional innovations in developing food systems, 
is central to our analysis. Below we explore in more detail these innovations. 
5.2. Organizational and institutional change 
First, organizational and institutional change occurs at different rates over products. Thus, in 
Mexico, for grains and meat one can find fully coordinated supply chains from farmers to 
supermarkets, with (1) branding and packaging; (2) direct purchase from suppliers or special 
agents, (3) distribution centers, (4) public and private standards, and (5) some contracts. But for 
fresh produce, one finds supermarkets relying on a mix of: (1) spot market relations in wholesale 
markets, (2) off-market specialized wholesalers such as Pedraza, and (3) direct contracts with 
large agribusinesses (Reardon et al., 2007).  
Second, product quality and safety standards are an important coordinating “institution” in 
transforming food systems, emerging in three stages. 
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(a) In the 1970s/1980s in developing countries there was a gradual emergence of public 
standards of quality to allow for long-distance grain trade with low transaction costs and risk, 
and phytosanitary public standards to allow for animal and horticulture product trade. 
(b) With product differentiation and the rise of trade in perishables, private standards for 
quality and safety began to emerge in the 1990s and 2000s especially manifest in export and 
processing. These were formulated by supermarket chains, large processors, and fast food 
chains to reduce losses in processing, increase shelf life, control quality and consistency, and 
assure safety (Reardon et al., 2001; Henson and Reardon, 2005; Swinnen, 2007). Examples 
include Nestle’s quality certification for grated coconut in Brazil (Farina et al., 2000) and 
potato variety specification for French fry production by McCain’s for McDonald’s in 
Argentina (Ghezan et al., 2002).
(c) Gradually governments have instituted public food safety regulations for retail and food 
service (for example, in China, Jia and Jukes, 2013). 
Third, finance arrangements evolved as coordination mechanisms, in three stages.
(a) In traditional systems, traders “tie credit,” advancing money or inputs to the farmer at 
the start of the season and expecting the harvest from that farmer at a prearranged price 
and with an implicit interest rate (Bardhan, 1980). 
(b) In transitional systems, there is competition among traders and risks of side selling, and 
farm households have off-farm cash sources. Tied credit disappears or is rare (e.g., 
Adjognon et al. 2017 for Africa). These show that formal and even informal finance are 
rare for farmers for agricultural investments; most cash is supplied from retained 
earnings form off farm jobs and farm product sales. 
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(c) In modern supply chains, in the cases where food industry firms must rely on small 
farmers to complete their supply, and small farmers face “idiosyncratic market 
failures” for credit and inputs, food industry sometimes use “resource provision 
contracts” (Austin, 1981) (for Latin America, Key and Runsten, 1999, for Madagascar, 
Minten et al., 2009). 
5.3. Technological change along the chain 
5.3.1. Farm technologies
Breeding research and variety change have been fundamental forces in fueling the 
“throughput” of feedstock in the transforming food system. R&D supply chains for new seeds 
and other inputs depend critically on a combination of the development of private seed markets 
as well as private and public sector breeding of improved seeds. 
There are two ways we can link product demand change (diet change) over a product cycle 
(niche to commodity to differentiated products) and food system transformation, to breeding 
research. 
The first path has received the most attention: grain breeding for drought or flooding and 
disease resistance and adaptation to small farmer conditions. The best known example is the 
Green Revolution and the system of NARS and IARCs that emerged to form R&D supply chains 
of new seeds (Lipton with Longhurst, 1989; Hayami and Ruttan, 1971, Binswanger, 1978). 
Another example is the shift from local varieties to breed for broad agroecological adaptation, 
such as the breeding of maize to fit drier areas an institute in Zaria in Northern Nigeria in the 
1980s (Byerlee and Eicher, 1997). 
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The second path links product cycle, breeding, and “commoditization.” This path has received  
little attention in the literature. One variant has been a focus on breeding for traits of quality and 
ability to store and process. A good example is the shift from traditional flint to innovated/bred 
dent maize in output composition induced by the take-off of industrial maize milling in the mid-
1800s in the US. Research to breed for quality and processing has recently emerged in 
developing countries as urban demand rose. An example is teff variety breeding for quality for 
the urban Ethiopian market (Minten et al., 2016) and rice quality in Bangladesh (Minten et al., 
2013). 
5.3.2. Non-seed inputs to support farming intensification
Supply chain development, urbanization, and industrialization of external input supply tend to 
be correlated. This drives down the cost of capital inputs (irrigation equipment, seeds, fertilizer, 
insecticides, herbicides, tractors and combines and sprayers), inducing their diffusion. Both the 
private sector, IARCs, and NARS have been engaged in R&D over the past century that have 
influenced the quality and cost (and existence) of these inputs. Four examples of private sector 
R&D cum extension supply chains of these innovations are of interest. 
First, as labor costs rose in the US and the UK in the 1940s, herbicides were created by 
private companies and government and were used to substitute for hand weeding. This 
innovation diffused in the US over the 1940s to the 1990s (Swinton and van Deynze, 2017). Due 
to increases of labor costs in developing regions, a parallel adoption of herbicides has occurred in 
waves similar to the system transformation waves from the 1970s to the 2010s (Haggblade et al., 
2017). 
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Second, as demand for machine use rose in the US in the 1800s as farms extensified and labor 
constraints appeared, the combine was invented by private persons in the US and Scotland. It 
diffused over the century, shifting from horse to steam to gas engine powered, with a string of 
innovations by companies such as John Deere. It was then adapted for small farms in the 1970s 
in Japan by Kubota, and from there diffused widely over developing Asia and into Africa in the 
subsequent decades. 
Third, as demand for water in horticulture rose in Germany, Australia, Israel, and California 
from the 1860s to the 1960s, there were a series of innovations from clay to plastic tubing that 
came to be termed drip irrigation. Again, as with the innovations above, starting in the 1970s it 
was adapted and diffused to developing countries, with innovations by companies like Netafim 
of Israel and then Jain Irrigation of India. 
Fourth, Notore Chemicals in Nigeria are a major supplier of agro inputs. They have developed 
a system for training and input distribution which uses local rural people to be their sales agents 
and credit and extension officers (Liverpool-Tasie et al., 2015).  
5.3.3. Post-farmgate technology change
As with farm technologies, a gradual increase in wage rates combined with a decrease in 
physical capital prices (from local industrialization and imports) induced midstream and 
downstream capital intensification and productive capital upgrading.  Demand side factors such 
as demand for new products, new quality and safety attributes, and greater and more storable 
volumes also induced technology change.
R&D supply chains to create and deliver new off-farm technologies noted below developed 
along with investments in the off-farm segments as “induced technological innovation.” These  
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sometimes started as basic science innovations in public research institutions with subsequent 
adaptation and further innovation by private companies. Many were the inventions of individual 
inventors, or of R&D units of companies. Some were all three of these, such as the cluster of 
inventions and improvements around freezers or tractors. As in farm technologies, much of the 
initial innovation occurred earlier, in currently developed countries historically, and then was 
transferred and adapted to developing countries.  We provide several prominent illustrations. 
(a) Logistics innovations
These have been fundamental to the elongation and de-seasonalization of the food system. 
Minten et al. (2016), for Ethiopia, show a rapid shift from transport of teff by foot (head loads) to 
animal transport (donkey/horses, carts), to motorized transport, and then from small trucks of 4-5 
tons to truck-trailers of 20 tons – a thousand years of transport change in a decade. Systems that 
had been relatively local switched to long distance commerce as large trucks and train lines 
combined to move potatoes from Northern to Southern India, abetted by potato varieties with 
tougher skins to transport further and store longer (das Gupta et al., 2010). A surprising case 
occurred in Myanmar: in 2011, bus transport was privatized and liberalized; bus lines 
proliferated and competed. One way they competed was by adding an iced cold shelf in the buses 
for fish to be transported from aquaculture areas in the south to Mandalay in the north. This gave 
rise to nearly 200,000 tons of fish moved by small merchants via many buses (Belton et al., 
2017). Zhang and Hu (2014) note the large role of infrastructure investments in improving 
logistics in the potato value chain from hinterland Gansu to the coastal cities.
(b) Processing scale and clustering innovation 
For example, as animal product value chains have transformed, poultry, fish, milk cow, and 
hog rearing has shifted its center of gravity from scattered small farms to peri-urban 
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agglomeration to clustered sites with small and medium commercial farms further from cities 
near cheap input bases (for aquaculture in Bangladesh, see Hernandez et al., 2017; dairy in 
Brazil, Farina et al. (2005); hogs and chickens in Thailand, see Poapongsakorn, 2012; for hogs in 
China, see Schneider (2011). There has been a concomitant rise of large processing firms for 
pigs and chickens, with location of large farms and large processing firms near the cities of 
China and Thailand, in a major shift away from scattered countryside processing operations in 
the 1990s and before.
(c) Freezing and Packaging innovations 
These are important to elongation of supply chains from near cities to near areas with low cost 
natural resources. For example, with rapid development of the frozen fish industry, fish is 
increasingly shipped longer distances within countries. An example is frozen fish from 
aquaculture areas in the South of China to Beijing, mainly developed in the 2010s as an 
outgrowth of an initial export operation base (Bai et al., 2017). Another case is the rise of frozen 
potatoes shipped long distance in Argentina to the burgeoning fast food chains (Ghezan et al.,  
2002), and frozen green vegetables and sweet corn in Chile (Milicivec et al., 1998).  
A similar change took place in dairy in Brazil (Farina et al., 2005). There was a combination 
of four internationally-transferred technology and organizational innovations that led to a 
massive increase in milk consumption, a rise in average dairy farm size and the exit of many 
small farms, and a spatial shift from peri-urban production to dairy production in cheap grain 
areas. The innovations include: (1) large scale dairy processing, brought by Nestlé and Parmalat 
who intensively invested in Brazil in the late 1980s after liberalization of FDI; (2) supermarket 
chains spread in the late 1980s and early 1990s with liberalization of retail FDI; the chains 
sought to source from large dairy companies to cut transaction costs; (3) the introduction by the 
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large companies of UHT (ultra-high temperature) treatment of milk (invented in Denmark in 
1910) which allowed milk to be stored at ambient temperatures if in vacuum packed containers, 
and thus the spread of milk retail even to areas yet without home refrigerators; (4) the layered 
vacuum-packed container technology invented in 1952 by Tetra Pak of Sweden, and brought to 
Brazil in the 1980s to facilitate mass processing of UHT milk. Farina et al. (2005) show that 
UHT milk went from 10% to 90% of milk consumed in Brazil just in the decade of the 1990s. 
(d) Extrusion for feed and noodles 
Food technology breakthroughs have been part of revolutions in food systems for a long time, 
from the invention of beer brewing in China and Egypt six millennia ago, and tofu and miso 
processing two millennia ago in China. With the recent rapid transformation of the food system, 
a dense cascade of such innovations has occurred this time packed in short time. These 
innovations reduced the cost, increased the shelf life, and vastly increased the hedonic attributes 
range, of processed products. For example, in baking  there were a series of advances in 
extrusion, frozen dough production, emulsifiers and enzymes, microwaves, ovens, and 
automation over the 20th century (Kamel and Stauffer, 1993). These innovations mainly started 
in Europe and the US, and then were transferred to developing regions. The same occurred with 
extrusion used for pelleted feeds and noodles. This led to rapid diffusion of pelleted, floating 
feed for example in Bangladesh aquaculture (Hernandez et al., 2017), and diffusion of Japanese 
ramen noodles manufactured by Indofoods in Nigeria (Liverpool-Tasie et al., 2017). 
(e) Traceability, inventory, and safety monitoring technologies 
Demand for time saving in shopping induced transfer of retail “technologies” and 
organization, like supermarkets and chain stores.  An example is the adoption of bar codes and 
electric scanners for inventory control. Food safety concerns among urban consumers of 
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perishables and rural and urban consumers of maize and peanut products induced food safety 
cum waste control measures like pasteurization of milk, addition of aflatoxin binders in stored 
maize by traders and millers, and humidity measuring devices and grain driers by traders and 
warehouse owners.
5.3.4. Emerging “Disruptive Technologies” in the Food System
In the past century there has been an intense stream of major technological innovations in 
agriculture and rest of the food system. At the time of their emergence, many of the technologies 
we discussed above were “disruptive” in the sense that they quickly and fundamentally changed 
the spatial or industrial organization structure of the system, its overall volume, its seasonality, 
and so on. Recent times have also brought a new generation of technologies that promise to, and 
have started to create sweeping changes in the overall global economy as well as food systems. 
We note three examples. 
The first is the emergence of gene-editing, CRISPR (Ledford, 2015). This promises to reduce 
the cost and time and increase the breadth of applications of genetic modification. That may 
change the amplitude and frequency of changes in the system, such as rapid iteration of changes 
in disease and drought resistance, improving quality, and increasing shelf life of products. 
The second is the rapid development of robots in the food system (Reardon et al., 2017). The 
general path of diffusion has been from upstream to downstream, and from developed to 
developing countries. The innovation has moved from incorporation of computer elements into 
existing machines (such as precision farming tractors and electric-eye conveyor belts for sorting 
fruit) to stand-alone non-autonomous machines (such as directed farm surveillance drones, 
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restaurant food preparation robots such as at Zume Pizza in San Francisco) to stand-alone 
autonomous machines emerging (pre-programmed or real time self-directing such as Bayer’s 
pilot “spider robots” that walk fields and monitor and perform activities such as spot application 
of herbicides, or warehouse box packers and stackers). These technologies are being applied both 
where labor is becoming more expensive but also in situations of cheap labor but other factors 
determining their use (such as the recent emergence of cashier-less supermarkets in India; 
Indiaretailing Bureau, 2017). The rapid rise of robots will have a series of easily foreseen 
consequences for the food system (such as a reduction in unskilled labor in all segments) and 
unforeseen and complex changes wrought on the structure and conduct. 
Third, the application of emerging big data tools for food systems research may also speed up 
the way we organize, convene, and inspire new agricultural research opportunities in the future 
(http://bigdata.cgiar.org) 
6. Food system transformation’s impacts
The immense changes wrought by the rapid and recent food system transformation have had a 
series of impacts. Here we indicate emerging evidence and points of debate on these impacts. 
However, a thread that runs through all the impacts is that the results have been mixed, with 
transformation being a two edged sword bringing benefits and challenges. 
6.1. Impacts on the entire food supply chain: debunking the “waste myth”
System transformation has increased the volumes and length of supply chains, and de-
seasonalized supply. One thus moves away from “niche” local markets to nationally integrated 
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and often more efficient markets. This leads to better price integration and smaller marketing 
costs (as shown in cereal market analysis in Ethiopia; Minten et al., 2014b). 
But the elongation of supply chains as well as the increase of perishables has raised concerns 
internationally, since the 1970s, that waste and loss in developing country food supply chains are 
substantial; for example, FAO (2011) hypothesizes, repeating a position taken for decades, that 
there is as much as 20%-30% waste and losses for cereals and pulses and meat and milk and fish, 
40% for roots and tubers, and 50% for fruits and vegetables. 
However, the hypothesis of high shares of waste is quite doubtful as revealed by empirical 
field studies. Bellemare et al. (2017), Affognon et al. (2015), and Sheahan and Barrett (2017) 
argue that measures of food waste are conceptually flawed and have led to an over-estimate of 
waste in food systems. Most systematic survey-based studies of actual actors in the supply chains 
tend to have much lower figures than the FAO hypotheses. Several of many possible examples 
follow: 
a) Lipton (1982) in India had direct measurement-based findings of low loss rates, and at 
that time questioned the then extant FAO estimates of 30-50% loss in grains. 
b) Greeley (1986, 1987) had similar findings of low waste/loss in rice in Bangladesh and 
shows that high waste/loss assertions/estimates from the 1970s that had become common 
wisdom were actually based on flawed data or no data.
c) A unique “stacked survey” based loss/waste measurement approach (Minten et al. 2016b 
and Reardon et al., 2012) that included details on waste in each segment of the value 
chains of potatoes and rice in China, India, and Bangladesh. They found only about 5% 
loss/waste over the whole supply chain for potato (excluding consumer level waste) and 
about 1% for rice. 
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d) A similar stacked survey estimate for post-harvest losses in the teff value chain in 
Ethiopia were found to be 2.2-3.3% of the teff harvest (Minten et al., 2016c). 
e) Kaminski and Christaensen (2014) used national level representative surveys of farm 
households for post-harvest losses in Malawi, Uganda, and Tanzania, and found a range 
of 1.4% to 5.9%, much lower than the post-harvest loss estimate of 8% for grains by 
FAO (2011). They found that loss was concentrated among 20% of farms in hotter and 
humid areas, with less market access.
f) Reyes et al. (2016), in a survey of 575 wholesalers and retailers in Nicaragua and 
Honduras, found post-harvest losses among them to total 8% for beans and 21% for 
tomatoes. 
6.2. Impacts on nutrition
There is mounting evidence that transformation of food systems has lowered the cost of food 
and reduced sharp seasonality in its supply. Some of the evidence is from the “quiet revolution” 
where the diffusion of SMEs in supply chains accomplished this; we return here to the example 
of potato cold storage proliferation in India (das Gupta et al., 2010; Minten et al., 2014), and 
processed teff for poor consumers in urban Ethiopia (Minten et al., 2016). Other evidence shows 
this for the “modern revolution” such as in dairy in Brazil and Argentina (Farina et al., 2005), 
grains and vegetables in Delhi supermarkets versus traditional markets (Minten et al., 2010, and 
for an overall review, Minten and Reardon, 2008.).
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Moreover, processed foods and other time saving devices have positive consequences of 
liberation of women’s time for education, labor market participation, and child care (for Nigeria, 
see Liverpool-Tasie et al., 2016b).
Yet there are a series of well-documented concerns of the rise of fast food and ultra-processed 
foods leading to obesity and health problems such as diabetes (Popkin, 2014,  for Asia and 
Popkin and Reardon, 2017, for Latin America). 
6.3. Impacts on inclusion or exclusion of small farmers
There are several recent reviews of the impacts of food system transformation on small 
farmers and the evidence tends to be mixed (Reardon et al., 2009). 
On the one hand, longer supply chains link rural areas to growing urban markets; diversifying 
food systems open opportunities to farmers to grow high value crops, meat, fish, and dairy. Some 
farmers enter resource provision contracts as discussed in Gow and Swinnen (1998); and others 
enter contracts offering price stabilization compared with traditional spot markets (Michelson et 
al., 2015). 
On the other hand, the available evidence shows that it tends to be the upper tier or half of 
small farmers who can access the modern channels, the urban markets, and the non-grain 
markets, as they require placement near enough to roads, water access, and specialized skills and 
equipment. Eventually as the chains modernize and increasingly demand quality and safety, 
those farmers reached must make basic investments in those attributes and that narrows the 
winners. The evidence shows that small farmers can still be included, but tend to not be the 
hinterland or asset-poor farmers (Reardon et al., 2009).
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6.4. Impacts on off-farm employment in rural areas
Both from the high-value diversification products being produced, and the large amount of 
activity post-farm gate occasioned by longer and more developed supply chains, there is a great 
deal of rural nonfarm employment linked to food supply chains generated by the transformation. 
There is growing evidence that women and youth are especially benefitted as these are low entry 
barrier jobs in transport, commerce, food preparation, and small scale processing (for Africa, see 
Tschirley et al., 2016).
As the food system modernizes there is, however, a challenge presented by cheaper urban 
processed foods penetrating rural areas and displacing traditional small enterprises (Reardon et 
al., 2007b), as well as dis-intermediation and large scale distribution firms displacing petty 
traders. 
6.5. Vulnerability of longer food supply chains
Developing countries face the trade-off between efficiency and reduction of supply risk to 
cities via diversification of supply sources as food systems develop, and increasing risks that can 
accost long exposed supply chains such as from  shocks from climate, environmental 
degradation, food safety, disease, sociopolitical unrest, and energy costs. Reardon and Zilberman 
(2017) argue that the strategies and investments that supply chain actors are and will take to 
mitigate or cope with those shocks will probably hasten the transformation, and in particular the 
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concentration of the system. This is a particular challenge to governments to help the hinterlands 
and asset-poor.
7. Implications for the agricultural research community 
There are several key implications of our analysis of the pathways of transformation of food 
systems for agricultural research strategies of the IARCs and NARS. 
First, IARCs and NARS have a strong vested interest in researching, understanding, and 
taking into account the whole food system and its transformation, adapting their strategies, plans, 
and choice and design of innovations in technologies and products. This also includes 
understanding the changing government policies, as well as private sector institutions (such as 
private standards) and procurement system and marketing organization. This is important for 
several reasons. Opportunities and bottlenecks along all three sets of supply chains determine the 
potential success of IARC/NARS innovations in the farming segment. Emerging requirements of 
the changing food system – in terms of product types, quality and safety attributes, shelf life, 
cost, consistency, seasonality, volumes, and so on - should influence priorities for IARC/NARS 
innovations.  This will help to determine whether innovations in farm technology and products 
lead to profitable marketed output by farmers, and thus ultimately, whether farmers will have the 
incentive to adopt new technologies. It is important for the research community to take into 
account that farmers themselves have deeply changed from just a few decades ago, far more 
involved in markets, commercialization, having intensified and diversified farming, and 
IARC/NARS strategies need to keep up with that change.
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Second, IARCs and NARS innovations need a supply chain to implement the innovations 
they generate. The upstream innovation is the beginning, not the end, of the process. The private 
sector in the food system is the centerpiece of the supply chain that delivers that upstream 
innovation. It is essential that IARCs/NARS understand the strategies, behavior, and needs of 
these two powerful sets of private sector actors, as the latter are essentially and in practical terms 
in charge of the direction of the entire food system.  25 years ago the private sector in the food 
system could be just a sidelight and “specialized” issue at the margin of food system thinking 
and agricultural research strategies: by becoming the dominant, central player in the food system, 
the private sector cannot be relegated to just a potentially interesting group to consult and 
observe at the edges. It is now at the center. It is now the group that decides what systems and 
structures will market and implement the innovations of technologies and products generated by 
the IARC/NARS. The ability of the latter to understand, adapt to, and selectively partner with the 
private sector will in the next decades be an important part of determining the performance of 
IARC/NARS innovations. In addition, important innovations are needed in transforming research 
institutions, investing in institutional change that would then be a key driver for technical 
change. There is a risk that rapidly transforming food systems would leave behind international 
and/or national public research organizations that are not transforming themselves to the new 
realities.
Third, the public research community needs to understand the importance of research on the 
off-farm components of the food system. Research on and productivity of processing, packaging, 
logistics, and commerce technologies have equal weight in the performance of the food system 
relative to the farm sector, and investment in research and development (R&D) value chains for 
these technologies and value chains for the inputs to these segments need a much higher profile 
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in the context of the transformed food system where post farm segments occupy 40-70% of value 
added. An argument for post-farm-gate research (so that it allows reduction of marketing 
margins in value chains to improve efficiency in the value chain) is usually a win-win for 
consumers as well as for producers. Moreover, returns on research (RoR) at the farm level 
clearly depend on concomitant innovations in the supply chain to supply inputs for or market the 
output of the innovation. 
Finally, we have signaled the importance of universities and CGIAR and NARS and 
companies forming public-private partnerships to generate and embody an “educational-
industrial complex” (Zilberman et al. 2012) where innovation starts at university research centers 
and ideas are then further developed either by applied research centers (like the CGIAR and 
NARS) or by private sector entities (startups, small companies, and major corporations). The 
involvement of university researchers in further development of the innovations has been 
identified as the contributor to success as well as effective marketing extension and outreach that 
is an important component of the overall supply chain that renders innovation into marketable 
products that generate income and employment for actors all along the food system.
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Table 1: Domestic food supply quantities (approximation of consumption by 
disappearance) & composition in millions of tons  & population
 1970 1990 2013
Africa food supply quantity (ton/capita/yr) 0.46 0.49 0.59
population (in millions) 339m 581m 995m
Africa total domestic food supply 156 285 587
Imports into Africa, tons (share of total 
domestic food supply) 11 (7%) 42 (15%) 123 (21%)
Exports from Africa, tons (share of total 
domestic supply) 17 (11%) 15 (5%) 39 (7%)
Staples: cereals (% total) 44 (28%) 84 (29%) 150 (26%)
Staples: roots & tubers (not potato) (% total) 34 (21%) 53 (19%) 116 (20%)
Non-staples (% in total) 79 (50%) 148 (52%) 320 (55%)
Asia food supply quantity (ton/capita/yr) 0.37 0.43 0.65
population 2.07b 3.13b 4.26b
Asia total domestic food supply 758 1,357 2,786
Imports into Asia, tons (share of total 
domestic food supply) 70 (9%) 176 (13%) 507 (18%)
Exports from Asia, tons (share of total 
domestic supply) 30 (4%) 90 (7%) 284 (10%)
Staples: cereals (% total) 300 (40%) 507 (37%) 663 (24%)
Staples: roots & tubers (not potato) (% total) 111 (15%) 87 (6%) 70 (3%)
Non-staples (% in total) 348 (46%) 762 (56%) 2,053 (74%)
LAC food supply quantity (ton/capita/yr) 1.57 1.67 2.02
Population 284m 441m 611m
LAC total domestic food supply 447 737 1,232
Imports into LAC, tons (share of domestic 
supply net of exports) 15 (3%) 42 (6%) 107 (9%)
Exports from LAC, tons (share of domestic 
supply) 48 (11%) 84 (11%) 271 (22%)
Staples: cereals (% total) 99 (22%) 162 (22%) 230 (19%)
Staples: roots & tubers (not potato) (% total) 38 (8%) 38 (5%) 65 (5%)
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Non-staples (% in total) 310 (69%) 536 (73%) 937 (76%)
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 The food system is the dendritic cluster of R&D value chains and the value chains linking 
input suppliers to farmers, and farmers upstream to wholesalers and processors 
midstream, to retailers then consumers downstream. 
 Developing regions’ (Africa, Asia, and Latin America) food systems have transformed 
very rapidly in the past several decades. Urbanization has been rapid, supply chains have 
grown long, diets have transformed deeply, structural changes have occurred both with 
consolidation (such as the rapid rise of supermarkets) and proliferation of small and 
medium enterprises (SME’s) in the midstream of the value chains. 
 Technology change, and the R&D systems that support it, have been extremely important 
to the transformation of food systems in developing regions. This has been equally 
important and innovative both at the farm and farm inputs level, and in the post-harvest 
segments. 
 The transformation of  food systems has been accompanied by lower food prices to poor 
consumers, low waste in long supply chains, increased vulnerability to shocks such as 
from climate and energy costs, and higher incomes and greater market opportunities for 
farmers who have been able to participate. It remains that low asset resource poor farmers 
are still challenged to diversify production and meet cost and quality and safety 
requirements of the developing urban markets. 
 The implications for agricultural research are that IARCs and NARS should invest in 
understanding the whole food system and its transformation, and take it into account in 
adapting their strategies, plans, and choice and design of innovations in technologies and 
products. The supply chain is needed to implement upstream innovations, and thus the 
private sector, small and large, are key implementation actors for research innovations. 
Finally, the public research community needs to understand the importance of research 
on the off-farm components of the food system. Research on and productivity of 
processing, packaging, logistics, and commerce technologies have equal weight in the 
performance of the food system relative to the farm sector.
0
ABSTRACT. Developing regions’ food system has transformed rapidly in the past several 
decades. The food system is the dendritic cluster of R&D value chains, and the value chains 
linking input suppliers to farmers, and farmers upstream to wholesalers and processors 
midstream, to retailers then consumers downstream. We analyze the transformation in terms of 
these value chains’ structure and conduct, and the effects of changes in those on its performance 
in terms of impacts on consumers and farmers, as well as the efficiency of and waste in the 
overall chain. We highlight the role of, and implications for agricultural research, viewed broadly 
as farm technology as well as research pertaining to all aspects of input and output value chains. 
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Rapid transformation of Food Systems in Developing Regions:  1 








”has transformed enormously over the past 50 years, with the main part of the 8 
most rapid change only in the past 25 years. It shifted from being a traditional system to a mix of 9 
transitional and modern. From a historical perspective, the transformation was abrupt, not 10 
gradual. Reardon and Timmer (2014), illustrating with Asian evidence, explain the sudden 11 
change as a function of a “confluence” of “five interlinked transformations.” They group them 12 
into three sets: 13 
 Downstream demand side change, “pulling” system transformation: (1) urbanization; (2) 14 
diet change; 15 
 Midstream/downstream change, “intermediating” system transformation: (3) food supply 16 
chain change in retail, wholesale, logistics, and processing;  17 
 Upstream change, “feeding” system transformation: (4) intensification of farming; (5) 18 
farm input supply chain change.   19 
Our paper extends the above work by comparing these transformations mainly in the past 25 20 
years in Asia, Africa, and Latin America. We further include attention to the role of and lessens 21 
for agricultural research
2
 strategies. We address four questions:  22 
                                                            
1 The food system is the set of input and output value chains that link input suppliers to farmers, 
and farmers upstream to wholesalers and processors midstream, to retailers then consumers 
downstream.  
2 Note that here “agricultural research” includes both research on the inputs and farm segment 
(breeding, input design, agronomic practices, and so on) and research on the off-farm post-farm 
segments (on technologies and organization of processing, packaging, logistics, wholesale, 




(1) How are food systems transforming? 1 
(2) How have research (mainly to develop new technologies in the farm segment as well as 2 
post-farmgate and input supply segments of the food system) and non-research factors 3 
(urbanization, income growth, diet change, policies) influenced food system 4 
transformation?  5 
(3) What have been the effects of the food system transformation on consumers and on 6 
incomes of small and medium farmers, as well as system performance measures such as 7 
supply of affordable and safe and quality food, and efficiency and waste in the chains? By  8 
chain-rule logical extension, we thus examine how research affects consumers and 9 
farmers via the “pathways” of food system transformation.
3
 10 
(4) What are the implications of the transformation of the food system for agricultural 11 
research strategies?  12 
Our findings lead to the two main messages of the paper.  13 
First, the farm-focused research community needs to take into account the entire food system 14 
and its transformation in their research strategies. This will determine whether innovations in 15 
farm technology and products lead to profitable marketed output by farmers and thus ultimately 16 
whether farmers will have the incentive to adopt new technologies. In the medium run, the urban 17 
market, and the food industry firms that increasingly mediate access to it, and input supply 18 
chains, and agribusiness firms that increasingly determine their development, set the market 19 
incentives and conditions for the affordability and profitability of new farm technologies.  20 
Second, the research community needs to understand and act on the importance of processing 21 
and logistics and wholesale (of outputs and inputs) in the food system, and research on these off-22 
                                                            
3 That is the terms of reference for this paper for the Special Issue. 
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farm components of the food system. Research on and productivity of technologies for input 1 
manufacture and output processing, packaging, logistics, and commerce have equal weight in the 2 
performance of the food system relative to the farm sector. Investment in research and 3 
development (R&D) value chains for these segments needs a much higher profile in the context 4 
of the transformed food system where off-farm segments occupy 40-70% of value added and 5 
costs.  6 
To address the research questions and justify those two messages we face two challenges.  7 
First, unlike other pathways (examined in this special issue) of the impacts of research on 8 
farmers and consumers, such as breeding research on farm yields, it is particularly complex to 9 
examine research impacts on food systems and thence on farmers and consumers. Research is 10 
just one of the conditioners of the transformation and its impacts. We thus have to put an 11 
emphasis on discussing the transformation itself and positing impacts of research in combination 12 
with other factors (such as demand side forces like urbanization) on the transformation and the 13 
impacts of the latter on farmers and consumers. There are some empirical tests but much of the 14 
argumentation will need to rely on causal association by inference and cases, for research effects 15 
on transformation.   16 
Second, as food system transformation in these regions is relatively recent, and the great 17 
majority of studies have been on the farm sector (as a holdover from the conventional wisdom 18 
extant decades ago when the food system was highly dominated by the farm segment and local 19 
traditional markets), empirical evidence on the transformation of the off-farm segments of the 20 
food system (input supply chains, output wholesale, processing, logistics, retail) is relatively 21 
limited and emerging and incomplete. We do our best to find and survey the key evidence, and 22 
suggest where it is strongest and weakest.   23 
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The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 lays out an illustrated conceptual framework linking 1 
research and non-research drivers of pathways (transformation of the food system), and thence 2 
on system performance. Section 3 lays out “downstream” drivers of overall food system 3 
transformation – urbanization, income growth, diet change, policies. Section 4 examines trends 4 
in the transformation of the structure, and Section 5, in the conduct (including technology 5 
change) of the food system. Section 5 discusses emerging evidence of the performance of the 6 
transforming food system, regarding waste, food supply costs and quality, and actor incomes. 7 
Section 6 concludes with implications for agricultural R&D strategies.  8 
 9 
2. The Food System as Dendritic 10 
The food system can be thought of as a “dendritic” system linking input supply chains and output 11 
supply chains. The agricultural research and development “supply chain” is just one of six sets of 12 
linked value chains. As an illustration let us examine the dendritic system in which a rice value 13 
chain is the central output value chain.    14 
The first and “core” supply chain is the output, here rice, value chain. It is composed of rice 15 
farmers (using land, labor, and capital such as machines and seeds and fertilizer) producing 16 
paddy. It is collected by rural wholesalers or transporters and taken to mills where it is de-husked 17 
and polished. The rice is then taken by wholesalers to urban wholesale markets and thence to 18 
retailers. 19 
The second and “first round feeder” supply chains, upstream in their totality from the output 20 
supply chain, are the farm input supply chains. For rice farmers these are the value chains of 21 
seed, fertilizer, and farm equipment. These in turn are fed by “second round” input supply chains 22 
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further upstream, those delivering phosphate to fertilizer factories, and steel and plastic to 1 
equipment factories, and so on.  2 
The third and “first round feeder” supply chains are those supply inputs to the post-farmgate 3 
segments of the output value chain, in a sense “laterally” into those segments. An example is the 4 
truck supply chain and fuel supply chain supplying the rice wholesale segment.  5 
The fourth supply chain in the dendritic cluster is usually thought of as “factor markets.” 6 
Those of “capital” and “intermediate inputs” we have put above in the second and third points 7 
above (for example, chicks are intermediate inputs, and a supplied machine or fertilizer is a 8 
factor input). But here in this fourth category we put land and labor. These are also supplied in a 9 
supply chain: labor is “produced” demographically, then processed (education and experience) 10 
then delivered (transport) to the worksite. Land is originally the wilds, processed as deforested 11 
and perhaps leveled and sold or rented. 12 
The fifth supply chain is a broad set of public assets apart from agricultural research 13 
institutions. Beside infrastructural services and assets such as protection and roads for the other 14 
supply chains, government (or private services) can supply enforcement for contracts and 15 
protection for actions of supply chain actors in the other supply chains.   16 
Sixth, feeding all the above are the research and development (R&D) supply chains which 17 
supply technology and product innovations. For instance, companies and NARS and IARCS 18 
breed new seeds which feed seed supply chains which supply paddy farms. Packaging material 19 
researchers in companies and public research centers invent new packing materials and  20 
processes (such as Tetrapak’s vacuum packing) which are supplied as “technology embodying 21 
inputs” to packaging supply chains which then supply dairy processors in the dairy output value 22 
chain.  23 
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The segments in each of the above value chains, and the six value chains themselves, are 1 
intertwined in “intersectoral (or intersegment) linkages.” The essential idea of linkages is that an 2 
increase in demand or supply from one segment “induces” investment in another segment or 3 
chain (Hirschman 1958). Production linkages can be upstream or downstream. An increase in 4 
coffee farm output can induce investment by firms in washing stations and roasters downstream 5 
from the farm, or upstream from the farm (say an increase in coffee farm output can induce 6 
investment by fertilizer firms wanting to sell to coffee farmers). Consumption linkages are 7 
similar but the inducement to investment comes from consumer demand at the end of the output 8 
value chain.  9 
The induced investment can also be in the formation of an R&D supply chain cum technology 10 
or product innovation. This occurs when innovators (public or private) or entrepreneurs design 11 
and market new technologies or new products to meet demand in other value chains. For 12 
example, if supermarket chains demand shelf-stability in vegetable varieties they contract to 13 
procure, innovators can endogenously implement a vegetable breeding innovation with an 14 
agricultural R&D value chain to breed a shelf stable variety, as derived demand from farmers 15 
wishing to supply the supermarket chain.    16 
But seen from the perspective of a given food system, there can be exogenous R&D 17 
“investment” that is not induced by factor scarcity or attribute demand in that food system. The 18 
R&D supply chain may endogenously arise in another context (another country, another product, 19 
etc.) and then present a technological innovation “exogenously” to the given food system. An 20 
example is the creation and manufacture of extruders for feed processing in the US to increase 21 
efficiency in both feed processing and feed consumption/use in the livestock sector. It might then 22 
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be transferred to Bangladesh large feed mills who imported machines embodying this 1 
innovation. This would then induce a structural change in the feed supply chain in Bangladesh.  2 
 We will return to this in the conduct section as it is a common technological innovation 3 
vector in developing country food systems.  4 
 5 
3. Transformation of Food Systems: downstream and context drivers 6 
3.1. Meta conditioners: Income growth, policy liberalization, and infrastructure 7 
investment 8 
There are three “meta conditioners” that encouraged and facilitated nearly all the 9 
transformations we discuss. These conditioners are themselves mutually dependent.  10 
First, income combined with population growth in the three regions was crucial as a pull factor. 11 
Incomes rose, especially starting in the 1980s in Latin America and Asia outside the transition 12 
countries (China, Vietnam, and India) and 1990s in Africa and the transition countries. The size 13 
of the food market increased and its composition diversified as discussed below. Typically urban 14 
areas have higher incomes than rural (e.g., in ESA, Eastern and Southern Africa not including 15 
South Africa, urban income per capita is double that of rural; Reardon et al. 2014). Furthermore, 16 
household income growth tended to be correlated with women’s increasingly working outside 17 
the home both in urban areas, and with a lag, rural areas. In turn, this increased the opportunity 18 
cost of time of women and led them to seek convenience – such as in processed foods, 19 
restaurants and street vendors, and supermarkets.  20 
Second, policy liberalization and privatization occurred during the 1980s and 1990s (from the 21 
transitions in China and Vietnam, to the de-reservations in India, to structural adjustment 22 
programs in Latin America and Africa). This policy change decreased to today a tiny minority 23 
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the direct role of governments in the food system. It also increased both private sector MSMEs 1 
(micro, small, and medium enterprises) that stepped into the void left by parastatals, and 2 
proliferated to meet urban market demand. It also led to the market entry of large-scale domestic 3 
and foreign firms such as processors and supermarket and fast food chains, as well as large input 4 
firms. The massive ingress of foreign companies was abetted by liberalization of the once-5 
ubiquitous foreign direct investment (FDI) regulations in the 1980s-2000s.  6 
Third, governments instituted large infrastructure investment programs, particularly in Asia 7 
and Latin America in the 1980s and 1990s. This reduced transaction costs and formed the 8 
foundation for food supply chain development from rural areas to the burgeoning cities and 9 
towns, and food distribution and processing within urban areas. This in turn facilitated 10 
urbanization itself. In some places in Africa (such as Ethiopia), there have also been massive 11 
road infrastructure investment programs.  For example, the total length of all-weather surfaced 12 
roads in Ethiopia tripled in less than 15 years, from an estimated 32,900 km in 2000 to 99,500 13 
km in 2013. This substantially improved connectivity of agricultural markets in the country. In 14 
1997/98 only 15% of the population was within three hours of a city with a population of at least 15 
50,000, a proportion that increased to 47% by 2010/11 (Minten et al. 2014). 16 
 17 
3.2. Urbanization 18 
The distance of the chain is determined from a procurement perspective by throughput needed 19 
and the probability of getting what is needed from close versus far. From a supplier’s 20 
perspective, it is a function of the distance needed to realize a profit on the supply side 21 
investment. If sufficient effective demand is geographically close in order to cover the 22 
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investment cost of farm inputs, or to maintain a high capacity utilization rate of a rural processor, 1 
then the supply chain can be short and local. Otherwise it lengthens to fulfill those conditions.  2 
In a traditional situation, the urban share of the population is low, and the great majority of the 3 
population is in the rural area. Supply chains are thus short and local, serving villages and nearby 4 
towns in the main. Typically, as urbanization occurs, supply chains must stretch out from the 5 
cities and grow longer as the city needs a larger and larger catchment area to feed itself. Braudel 6 
(1979) paints a famous picture of the London of the 1300s feeding itself from a few local shires 7 
to the London of the 1500s requiring food supply chains stretched all over England and beyond. 8 
This same process occurred in Latin America, Asia, and now Africa, with several points salient.  9 
First, the urban share of the population has risen vertiginously in the past half century, in 10 
waves across the regions.  11 
(1) Latin America’s urbanization was earliest, with the urban share roughly 40% in 1950, 12 
55% in 1970, 65% by 1990, and 75% by 2010 (UN 2014).  13 
(2) Asia’s urban share was only 20% in 1960, rising to 45% on average by 2011, and 14 
projected to 60% by 2025 (UN 2011). The region average disguises substantial variation 15 
over sub-regions. UN (2014) shows 32% in South Asia, 44% in Southeast Asia, and 54% 16 
in East Asia by 2010.  17 
(3)  Africa had a 40% urban population share by 2011, up from 24% in 1970 and projected to 18 
average 48% by 2030 (UN 2011).  There is a lot of diversity over the sub-regions as in 19 
Asia. UN (2014) shows Southern Africa including South Africa as having an urban share 20 
of population of 59%. Developing Eastern and Southern Africa (excluding South Africa), 21 
what we term ESA, had an urban share of 21% in 2000, 26% by 2015, and is projected to 22 
be 44% by 2050. The latter is like West Africa in 2014, at 44%. The latter figure even for 23 
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a specific sub-region masks the heterogeneity in all regions; for instance, the urban share 1 
in population in Nigeria is 50% by 2015 (Bloch et al. 2015).  2 
Rather than being starkly different in terms of urbanization, Africa and Asia are converging 3 
on urban shares. ESA’s share is close to South Asia, and West Africa’s, close to Southeast Asia.    4 
Second, the urban food market is in fact the majority food market on average in the three 5 
regions. This is because urban areas have higher incomes than rural areas, enough so to 6 
overwhelm the negative relation of income and overall food budget share noted by Engel’s Law. 7 
In an Asian study of Bangladesh, Nepal, Indonesia, and Vietnam, Reardon et al. (2014b) show 8 
that while 38% of the population is urban, 53% of the (purchased) food market is urban. Even in 9 
the poorest region, ESA, 26% of the population is urban but cities consume 48% of food 10 
produced and sold in the countries (Dolislager et al. 2015).  11 
Third, the urban food market has grown very fast in several decades – hence so has the rural-12 
urban food supply chain. Haggblade (2011) estimates this growth at 600-800% over three 13 
decades for Africa; Reardon and Timmer (2014) have it at roughly 1000% in Southeast Asia in 14 
the same period.   15 
 16 
3.3. Diet change 17 
 18 
a) Rise in the share of non-cereals   19 
As incomes rise, “Bennett’s Law” (Bennett, 1954) predicts a shift toward a higher proportion 20 
of non-staples in the diet. At a system level, this means that with development (which we 21 
roughly proxy by GDP per capita), one expects disproportionate growth of the supply chains of 22 
non-staples such as vegetables and fruit, meat and fish, dairy, and edible oils. Table 1 shows this 23 
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with macro data from FAOSTAT for 1970 to 2013 with shares of tons of consumption-by-1 
disappearance.    2 
(1) For Africa, there was only gradual change over the 43 years, with the share of cereals 3 
inching down from 28% to 26%, roots/tubers stable at around 20%, and non-staples 4 
rising from 50 to 55% - a slim majority.  5 
(2) For Asia, the results were more dramatic: cereals were 40% in 1970, inched down to 37% 6 
by 1990, and then dropped to only 24% by 2013. Timmer (2013) and Timmer et al. 7 
(2010) use macro data on rice to show that in most Asian countries there has been a 8 
stagnant trend in rice consumption per capita, and even in some cases (country and strata 9 
and zones) a gradual decline. Roots/tubers moved from 15% to only 3% over the period. 10 
By contrast, the striking winner in the diet was non-staples, soaring from 46% to 74%. 11 
(3) Latin American diet composition changed less during the period compared to the other 12 
two regions. This could be because a considerable part of Latin America’s rapid 13 
development occurred in the 1960s-1970s, two decades earlier than most of Africa and 14 
Asia. So that even by 1970, staples were only 30% of Latin American consumption, and 15 
that share had only dropped to 24% by 2013.    16 
Recent micro level survey data on household food expenditures corroborate the above macro 17 
figures, and allow us to distinguish urban and rural, richer and poorer.  18 
 For Asia, Reardon et al. (2014b) analyzed household survey data (LSMS) from 2010 and 19 
found that that for South Asia (Nepal and Bangladesh) and Southeast Asia (Indonesia and 20 
Vietnam), the share of cereals (mainly rice) in the food budget in value terms was about 26% for 21 
urban and 37% for rural households. Government of India (2010) showed that the share of cereal 22 
in the urban diet (in value terms) dropped from 36% in 1972 to 23% in 2006. In the same period, 23 
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the share of cereals in rural diets dropped from 56% to 32%. Despite average income differences 1 
between the South Asian sample and the Southeast Asian sample, the shares of cereals in urban 2 
food budgets were similar (29% in South Asia and 23% in Southeast Asia). Meat and fish 3 
averaged 30% of the urban budget – itself equal to the grain share. Horticulture products 4 
averaged 15%. Together meat/fish and horticulture average 45%, more than grains all together.  5 
LSMS survey findings belie the idea that Africa is sharply different from Asia in food trends. 6 
For ESA urban and rural areas, Dolislager et al. (2015) found for Malawi, Tanzania, Uganda, and 7 
Zambia, that the share of grains (mainly maize) in urban food expenditure (in value terms) was 8 
34%, and rural, 39%. The share of non-grains in urban food expenditure was 66%, and rural, 9 
61%. Interestingly, they found the patterns for the poor stratum were not that different from the 10 
other strata.  11 
For West Africa urban areas, Hollinger and Staatz (2015) analyzed data from urban food 12 
expenditure studies. Where the main staples are grains alone (Burkina Faso, Mali, and Senegal), 13 
they found that the share of grains in diets in value terms increased some over several decades: 14 
from 33 to 38%. Thus two-thirds of consumer expenditure is on non-grains. Animal products and 15 
fish are the foremost items in this set: in the 2000s they formed a quarter of total food 16 
expenditure. Fruits/vegetables average another 12% (compare that with 16% in Asia and the 17 
US), so meat plus horticulture products equal grain expenditure in the urban Sahel. 18 
They found that for the countries where grains plus roots/tubers are the staples (Cote d’Ivoire, 19 
Ghana, and Nigeria), the share of grains dropped from 27 to 23% and tubers/roots rose from 14 20 
to 17% over the 1990s to the 2000s. The share of non-staples (neither grains nor roots/tubers) 21 
was about 60%.  Again meat/fish was found to be 21% of expenditure, and horticulture products, 22 




(b)  Shift of the diet toward (purchased) processed products 2 
Research in the 1980s-1990s examined the incipience of processed food purchase in 3 
developing regions. It was driven by a new era of income increases and emerging urbanization. 4 
Processed food was seen as a time-saver for women whose opportunity cost of time increased as 5 
they entered the labor force outside the home. The emergence of the shift was shown in Latin 6 
America (Amat y Leon and Curonisy, 1981, Peru; Sri Lanka (Senauer et al. 1986); Cote d’Ivoire  7 
(Bricas and Muchnik, 1985 for West Africa; Kennedy and Reardon 1994 for East Africa).  8 
There has been a revival and broadening of interest in urbanization and food systems in the 9 
2000s. This occurred with the confluence of ease of import of processed foods and substantial 10 
FDI in processing as well as domestic investment in the 1980s and 1990s. Recent work has 11 
shown that its penetration is now substantial, in Asia (e.g., Pingali 2007) and in both urban and 12 
rural Africa and Asia (e.g., Tschirley et al. 2015 and Reardon et al. 2014b, respectively).  13 
It is often thought in Africa that the processed food is imported as final manufactured items. 14 
Several recent studies test that hypothesis and reject it. For Nigeria, Liverpool-Tasie et al. 2017 15 
found that while imported processed goods dominate in numbers of types of products, they are a 16 
minority in retail volume terms. Of course, a number of these products depend at least partially 17 
on imported raw materials such as flavorings, wheat, and milk powder.  18 
In the ESA study of Tschirley et al. (2015), 56% of urban household food expenditures (in 19 
value terms) went to processed foods, and for rural households, 29%. In the Asia study of 20 
Reardon et al. (2014b), urban households were found to dedicate 73% of food expenditures to 21 
processed foods, and rural areas, 60%. This did not differ much over middle class versus poor 22 
families in the African and Asian studies: the quest of convenience in the face of opportunity 23 
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costs of time dominated for both. It is interesting that in processed food penetration so far, rural 1 
Asia is like urban Africa, and that both Africa and Asia are tending in the same direction. 2 
 3 
(c) Shift of the Product Composition among grains, micro evidence 4 
Changes in diet have occasioned three types of shifts among grains.  5 
First, the surge in demand for livestock products has translated into the precipitous rise of 6 
demand for maize as a feed grain. A striking example is that maize had been half of the tonnage 7 
of rice in 1993 but by 2013 overtook rice in production in China (Zheng, 2013). As in the US, 8 
nearly all maize in China goes into feed for animals. In Bangladesh, the aquaculture domestic 9 
supply chain grew in volume 25 fold in three decades (nearly all for the domestic market); this 10 
led to a massive rise in the feed industry and demand for feed grains (Hernandez et al. 2017). 11 
Liverpool-Tasie et al. (2016) show that the maize-based feed industry grew 600% in the past 10 12 
years as derived demand from the aquaculture and chicken sectors that have recently started a 13 
rapid shift to the use of feed in Nigeria.  14 
Second, the rise of demand for convenience foods by consumers has as a derived demand a 15 
rapid rise in wheat and rice as non-traditional grains for processed products. In Asia areas where 16 
rice traditionally reigned, wheat has made inroads in the form of noodles and bread (Senauer et 17 
al. (1986), for Sri Lanka; Pingali (2007) for Asia overall). Timmer (2013) shows for Southeast 18 
Asia that wheat imports into Southeast Asia rose from 1 million tons in 1961 to 13 million by 19 
2010, and wheat consumption from 2.8% to 11.5% that of rice.  20 
In East Africa, the rise of wheat consumption has also been driven by convenience food 21 
demand (Kennedy and Reardon 1994) as in Southeast Asia. In West Africa, there has been a rise 22 
of wheat and rice in consumption for similar reasons (Reardon 1993; Hollinger and Staatz, 23 
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2015).  Wheat consumption in West Africa has also started to rise not just via the half century 1 
old luxury of bread for the middle class, but now as cheap fast noodles and bread sandwiches for 2 
the poor. An example is the rapid spread of the Indonesian multinational Indofood’s “indomie”, a 3 
packaged (wheat) ramen noodle, produced by Indofood FDI in Nigeria, that appears ubiquitous 4 
in Nigeria (cooked often with egg, and thus a fillip to egg consumption) (Liverpool-Tasie et al. 5 
2016b).  6 
Due to this shift to rice and wheat for convenience, some countries’ governments have been 7 
pursuing “import substitution” drives for grains, such as recommended by African Development 8 
Bank (2016). Examples include drives to be self-sufficient in rice in Senegal and “tropicalized 9 
wheat” in Nigeria (Ohimain, 2014). This follows earlier waves of similar “internalization” of 10 
exotic food species, such as in Africa where maize, introduced from meso-America, and only 11 
“took off” a century ago (McCann, 2000), or such as cassava (Nweke 1996), introduced from 12 
Brazil into Africa with a period of intense promotion and relatively sudden diffusion. It remains 13 
to be seen whether the new wave of substitution (promoting local production of tropical wheat 14 
and local rice) will also massively succeed in the way maize and cassava where introduced.  15 
Third, in a number of countries there is a shift toward what consumers perceive as higher 16 
quality grains. For example, in Bangladesh, there is a shift toward higher quality rice (away from 17 
coarse rice toward more fine rice). This has had implications for the milling sector (they are 18 
doing more rice polishing) and for farmers from whom wholesalers and millers are demanding 19 
the higher quality varieties (Minten et al. 2013). In Ethiopia, there is a shift away from the cheap 20 
red teff to the more expensive and preferred white teff. This increasing shift in intra-cereal 21 




4. Structural change in the food system 1 
4.1. Stages and waves of structural change of the food system 2 
As an initial qualifier, note that in a dendritic food system at any moment some value chains 3 
may be in one stage while others in another. Moreover, there has been, as one would expect, a lot 4 
of variation in the timing of take-off and speed and stage of transformation of food systems 5 
across products, across regions, and across countries within regions, and across zones within 6 
countries. The classifications we discuss below are found in different distributions (discussed 7 
further in subsequent sections) across the heterogeneous sets of developing countries. 8 
We observe three stages of structural and conduct change of the food system. 9 
(1) The least advanced stage is the “traditional” system. This tends to be spatially short 10 
(“local”) and fragmented in structure, using technologies with little capital and much labor, 11 
with no contracts or formal standards, and spot markets linking all segments.  12 
(2) The next stage is the “transitional.” It is spatially long (as cities grow and their catchment 13 
area is larger and larger) but still fragmented. Chain actors use a mix of labor-intensive and 14 
capital intensive technologies. There are emerging public standards of quality. But still spot 15 
market relations dominate.  16 
(3) The most advanced stage is “modern.” It also is usually spatially long. But it is 17 
consolidating in a number of segments (such as in retail, the rise of supermarkets). There is also 18 
some “dis-intermediation” such as supermarkets buying directly from processors, or urban 19 
wholesalers directly from farmers. Private standards are emerging, and some use of contracts. 20 
Capital intensification is common as the modern stage tends to coincide with higher wages in an 21 
economy and more quality and safety control are demanded by the food industry. 22 
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The second set of stages is the waves of diffusion of food system transformation over space 1 
and products. The first wave was the earliest group of developers in developing regions (after the 2 
earlier waves of transformations of food system in what are now the “developed countries”).   3 
(1) The first wave included East Asia outside China (such as South Korea) and South America 4 
such as Brazil, with food system transformation taking off in the 1980s.  5 
(b) The second wave was in Mexico and Central America and in parts of South America (such 6 
as Colombia, Chile), Southeast Asia outside “transition” countries, and South Africa (with the 7 
take-off starting in earnest in the 1990s).   8 
(c) The third wave, taking off mainly in the 2000s, includes the “transition” countries, China 9 
and Vietnam, and India, South American countries “catching up” such as Peru and Bolivia, and 10 
parts of Africa especially in southern and eastern Africa.  11 
The fourth wave that is emerging in the 2010s includes West Africa.  12 
There are also waves of diffusion of transformation by product category, with grains value 13 
chains transforming earliest, animal products next, and fresh fruits and vegetables last. (These 14 
waves are similar to the pattern of diffusion of change in Europe and US food systems earlier.) 15 
 16 
4.2.  Dimensions of Structural change in food systems  17 
The structure of the food supply chains in the developing regions has been transforming 18 
rapidly, especially in the past two decades. By structural change of the food system we mean the 19 
following, which also serves as a preview of the section’s structure:  20 
(1) volume growth in the overall system;  21 
(2) product composition change of the system;   22 
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(3) spatial elongation of the value chains, including growth in rural to urban, rural to rural, 1 
and urban to rural supply chains;  2 
(4) restructuring of the overall system, including an increase in the share of post-farmgate 3 
segments as well as emerging “disintermediation”; 4 
(5) concentration or de-concentration of individual segments.  5 
We treat each of these important changes in turn.  6 
 7 
4.2.1. Volume growth in the overall system 8 
Food volumes grew a lot from 1970 to now with the steepest increase from 1990 to 2013 (the 9 
latest year in FAOSTAT). This pattern roughly tracks the path of “economic development.” For 10 
simplicity we equate the latter with average income growth. Note that food volumes increased a 11 
lot at the same time there was a reduction of agriculture in total GDP, as expected from Engel’s 12 
Law.  13 
Table 1 shows “food supply quantities” from FAO food balance sheets for 1970, 1990, and 14 
2013. These figures are FAO’s measure of “domestic consumption by disappearance” per capita, 15 
that starts with aggregate production, adds imports, and deducts disposal of the output (exports, 16 
waste, storage for the next year, and use as seed). We then use their population data to derive 17 
aggregate consumption by disappearance per region. This is a rough measure of the food system 18 
expansion as it is only in physical terms, not value or nutrition terms. A physical measure 19 
probably underestimates growth in value terms as non-staples, which grew the fastest, have 20 
higher prices on average than grains or roots/tubers. But our goal here is not fine precision but 21 
orders of magnitude and key trends. Several points emerge. 22 
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First, in 43 years, the total “food system” in these three developing regions grew from about 1 
1.3 to 5 billion tons, 4-fold, faster than population grew (from 2.6 to 6.5 billion, 2.5 fold). 2 
Interestingly, the trends did not differ much over the three regions.  3 
(1) Africa’s food volume expanded 1.8 times in the first two decades and then 2.1 times in 4 
the following 25 years, hence 3.8 times over 45 years. Output increase just kept pace with 5 
population 1970-1990, and then from 1990 to 2013 the ratio was 1.2.  6 
(2) Asia’s total food supply rose 1.8 times in the first 20 years and then 2.1 times in the next 7 
25 years, for overall growth of 3.8 times in 43 years, about the same as Africa. In per 8 
capita terms, it grew 1.2 times from 1970 to 1990, and then 1.5 times in the next 25 years.  9 
(3) Latin America’s total food supply in tons rose 1.7 times in the first 20 years and then 10 
again 1.7 times in the next 25 years, for overall growth of 2.8 times in 45 years. In per 11 
capita terms, it grew 1.1 times from 1970 to 1990, and then 1.2 times in the next 25 years.   12 
Second, imports as a share of food supply (net of exports) has risen over the decades, but is 13 
still a minority. In Africa, tons of imports rose 11 times over the 45 years – and constituted from 14 
7% to 15% to 21% of our rough measure of consumption by disappearance. In Asia, it rose 7 15 
times in tons and went from 9% to 13% to 18% of total consumed tons. In Latin America, it rose 16 
7 times in tons but again a small share: from 3% to 6% to 9%. Africa and Asia’s import growth 17 
occurred steadily over the whole half century. Already in the late 1980s and early 1990s it was 18 
entering the debate as a trend driven by income increases and urbanization and women’s 19 
opportunity cost of time driving demand for convenience foods and thus rice and wheat imports 20 
(see for example Reardon 1993). It has continued in the African debate (African Development 21 
Bank 2016).  22 
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Third, agricultural exports, while often important in policy debates, are relatively small 1 
compared with the domestic food system. In Africa, these reached about 7% of the level of 2 
domestic consumption; in Asia, 10%; in Latin America, 22%. It was especially in Latin America 3 
that exports rose in the well-known story of its export success in the globalization period. 4 
 5 
4.2.2. Product composition change of supply side of the system 6 
 Given that imports are a minor share of food availability, one would expect supply 7 
composition changes to roughly follow diet change. This has the following supply side impacts.  8 
First, the overall volume growth over 43 years plus product composition change in the diet 9 
has meant huge growth in the volumes of the product supply chains themselves, especially in 10 
non-staples; per Table 1, 340% in cereals volume, 400% in non-staples; in Asia, 220% in cereals, 11 
590% in non-staples; in Latin America, 230% in cereals, and 300% in non-staples. 12 
Second, the rapid demand growth for meat and fish created a concomitant surge in feed 13 
supply chains, and derived from them, supply chains for domestic ingredients for feed, especially 14 
of maize (such as from Northern to Southern Nigeria), oilseed cake, fodder, rice bran, cassava. 15 
These supply chains quickly form and grow as rapid growth in animal products consumption is 16 
combined with a shift from grazing or open capture to feed based systems. 17 
Fourth, the demand shift to processed foods created a surge in supply chains of processed 18 
products, both for low-processed products such as maize meal or polished rice, and high and 19 
ultra-processed products, such as potato or banana chips and noodles.  20 
 21 
4.2.3. Spatial elongation & reconfiguration of the system 22 
(a) Immense growth of rural to urban food supply chains 23 
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As noted above, roughly 50-75% of domestic food supply now goes to cities. This is very 1 
different from the 1970s when that share was roughly 20-30% depending on the region. When 2 
the urban share was low, supply chains were short, with local farmers feeding themselves and 3 
local villages and towns. As the urban share rose, and the cities got bigger, supply chains 4 
stretched further and further to fulfill the enormous needs of the cities. As domestic supply 5 
chains surge to feed cities, several points stand out. 6 
 First, seen from the countryside, most food goes to cities. About 75% of Indonesian mangoes 7 
are sold to Indonesian urban consumers; another 5% is home-consumed, and 20% are sold to 8 
rural consumers; only 0.1% are exported (Qanti et al. 2017).  In ESA, the least urbanized and 9 
poorest region, 46% of cereal consumption (home-consumed by farmers and purchased by rural 10 
and urban households) is consumed in urban areas; 61% of purchases of cereal are in urban 11 
areas. In overall consumption, urban is 52% of fruit and vegetables, 58% of meat and fish, and 12 
63% of edible oils (Reardon et al. 2014b).  13 
Second, the product categories growth plus the rise in the share of urban consumption in total 14 
national consumption noted above together yield the result that one can double or triple the 15 
product category volume growth rates to get a rough idea of how much the volume of rural-to-16 
urban supply chains increased. For instance, for Africa, this means that non-staple rural-urban 17 
supply chains increased about 800 to 1000% (depending on the sub region) over the past 45 18 
years. That figure is about 1800% for non-staples in Asia. These enormous climbs represent a 19 
major investment by actors along the supply chain from farmers to urban retailers and 20 
wholesalers.  21 
  22 
(b) Rural-to-rural and urban-to-rural supply chain growth 23 
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Even rural markets are developing fast.  1 
First, the rural market has grown a lot simply based on rural population growth.  In Africa 2 
over three decades, rural population grew 2.8 fold from 0.37 billion in 1970 to 1.05 billion in 3 
2011 (UN 2011). In Asia, the comparable figures are rural population growth two fold from 2.1 4 
billion in 1970 to 4.2 billion in 2011.  5 
Second, the increase in the rural market in value terms is of course greater than what just 6 
population growth shows, for there is abundant evidence that rural incomes have grown over 7 
several decades – with of course a lot of variation over rural areas. There is also evidence that 8 
even in the poorest regions, a middle class has emerged in rural areas; Tschirley et al. (2015) 9 
demonstrate that 55% of the middle class in the ESA is in rural areas.  10 
Third, rural purchases of food are now very important. The traditional situation was one of 11 
farm households being either self-sufficient or buying a little of their food. While early work 12 
such as Mellor (1976) in India and Reardon et al. (1988) in Africa pointed out that a lot of rural 13 
households, even farmers, are net buyers of grains, the share of overall food that was purchased 14 
was traditionally low. This of course differed by semi-arid versus more humid areas, such as in 15 
Senegal, where purchases of food were important for the drought prone areas and much less 16 
important in the relatively lush areas (Kelly et al. 1993). 17 
But recent data show high shares of purchased food in rural diets in Africa and Asia. In ESA, 18 
Dolislager et al. (2015) show rural households bought 44% (in value terms) of food they 19 
consume. The share is 70% in Nigeria (Liverpool-Tasie et al. 2016). In the Reardon et al. 20 
(2014b) study of Bangladesh, Nepal, Indonesia, and Vietnam, rural households averaged 73% for 21 
the purchase share of their food (in value terms).  22 
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Fourth, it appears that this skyrocketing of food purchases by rural households is financed 1 
mainly by rural nonfarm employment (RNFE) as well as by agricultural product sales. Very little 2 
is purchased on credit, whether from informal or formal sources (Adjognon et al. 2017, for 3 
Africa). RNFE is roughly 40% of farm household total incomes in Africa and Asia, and a much 4 
higher share of total cash available, and far higher than migration income or credit flows 5 
(Haggblade et al. 2007). The share can be even higher, such as in China, where the share of rural 6 
nonfarm income in total income has risen from 34% in 1985 to 63% in 2000 to 71% in 2010 7 
(Huang et al. 2012).  8 
 9 
(c) Consequences of longer and reconfigured supply chains for small farmers 10 
There are several potential consequences for farmers of these spatial shifts.  11 
First, urban markets have become the main markets facing farmers. This is an important 12 
opportunity as it presents a source of effective demand far greater than the typical rural area.  13 
Second, however, the urban market also poses challenges in two sets of ways. 14 
Even in the absence of modernization such as the rise of supermarkets. Urban traders seek a 15 
diverse set of zones to reduce seasonality and supply risk. They have the logistics and purchasing 16 
power at times to require that different regions compete for their procurement. This means that 17 
farmers from a given zone no longer have a “protected” local market but are competing with 18 
farmers large and small from their zone and others for the urban market. They might even be 19 
competing with foreign suppliers who sell via importers to urban wholesale markets (Reardon 20 
and Minten 2011 for India).  21 
But as urban markets modernize with the rise of supermarkets (discussed below), the 22 
competition by a region for supplying to urban supermarket procurement centers heightens, and 23 
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becomes more challenging yet with the imposition of private grades and standards. Reardon et al. 1 
(2007) and Berdegue et al. (2005) illustrate this for the cases of Mexico and Central America. 2 
Processing firms and supermarkets based in towns also tend to prefer supply regions with low 3 
transaction costs, and eschew contracting with farmers in hinterland zones (Barrett et al. 2012).   4 
Third, a key consequence of the above is that as rural purchases grow, rural to rural and urban 5 
to rural (especially of processed food) flows increase. The latter makes the proximity of rural 6 
suppliers to secondary/tertiary cities a two-edged sword. On the one hand, the proximity brings 7 
the benefits of agglomerated upstream and downstream services in the supply chain that farmers 8 
need for profitable commercialization and intensification. On the other hand, the close-by towns 9 
are conduits for a steady flow of cheap packaged processed foods that may benefit consumers on 10 
the cost side but compete with existing or would be small enterprises in the villages (Reardon et 11 
al. 2007b). There are many examples of this, such as Indofoods packaged noodles and drinks into 12 
rural towns in Indonesia and Nigeria (Liverpool-Tasie et al. 2017b). There is also an archetypal 13 
case of ready-made tortillas or tortilla mixes coming into rural towns from urban processing 14 
firms in Mexico (Rello, 1996).  15 
Fourth, longer supply chains linking rural to urban, rural to rural, and urban to rural, means 16 
heightened vulnerability to shocks that beset long exposed chains – shocks of climate change 17 
(Reardon and Zilberman, 2017), energy cost spikes, disease outbreaks, food safety crises, and 18 
sociopolitical strife. A case in point is the vulnerability to all these represented by the dynamic 19 
south-north and north-south maize and egg supply chains in Nigeria (Liverpool-Tasie et al. 20 




4.2.4. Change in overall structure of the system, including an increase in the  post-1 
farmgate and  “disintermediation”  2 
a) Increase in the share of the “post-farmgate” segments in the developing food system 3 
In a local traditional short supply chain, very little of the value added of the chain is due to 4 
off-farm components of the supply chain – the midstream (wholesalers, logistics agents, 5 
processors) and downstream (retailers). The farmer sells the grain or milk to neighbors and 6 
transports it herself. The consumer buys the raw product and processes it herself.  7 
As the chain grows spatially longer, the market volume grows large enough, and economies 8 
of specialization emerge in the midstream and downstream segments, their shares rise a lot 9 
compared with traditional chains. Reardon (2015) reviewed evidence and produced a rough 10 
estimate for Asia and Africa food supply chains of about 40% of value added from farms, 40% 11 
from midstream (what he calls the “hidden middle” as this segment is usually ignored in both 12 
policy debates and research) and 20% from the downstream. This share varies over products and 13 
regions. 14 
 15 
b) System restructuring with the emergence of a “Quiet Revolution” of MSMEs in the 16 
food system  17 
A “traditional” short local supply chain could have just the farmer selling to other villagers, or 18 
a rural broker selling to a traditional small retailer in a local town. As supply chains develop to 19 
cities, and gradually consumers purchase processed products, there is a proliferation of 20 
midstream MSMEs in wholesale and processing, as well as upstream in input supply. This is part 21 
of the “transitional stage” and is the dominant situation now in Africa and South Asia. Typically 22 
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the farmer’s share in the total value added of the supply chain drops fast during this period as the 1 
share of intermediaries and logistics and processors rises. 2 
A series of recent studies in South Asia, China, Vietnam, and Africa have termed this a “Quiet 3 
Revolution” wherein tens of thousands of MSMEs emerge to develop in a “grassroots” way the 4 
food system (Minten et al. 2010; Reardon et al. 2012, 2014c). These studies show how dynamic 5 
these MSMEs are in developing the food system. Three examples intrigue.  6 
First, there has been a rapid emergence of MSME potato cold storages in Bihar (Minten et al., 7 
2014) and Western Uttar Pradesh near Delhi (Das Gupta et al., 2010). We focus on the latter. A 8 
survey of cold storages in Agra found that the combination of the rapid development of 9 
vegetable demand in Delhi, the improvement of the road link from Agra to Delhi, the 10 
introduction of a disease-resistant and long-shelf-life potato variety, the introduction of an 11 
electricity grid, the partial subsidizing of irrigation pumps and cold storage equipment, and the 12 
economy’s generating investable funds among the intermediate city business sector, led to very 13 
rapid and deep change in the cold storage sector in Agra and, in turn, on the seasonality and cost 14 
of potatoes in Delhi and intermediation patterns in the rural area. In the early 1990s relatively 15 
few farmers grew potatoes in Agra and there were almost no modern cold storages. By the late 16 
1990s cold storages had risen to store 40% of the vastly larger potato output, and by 2009, 80%. 17 
Traditional on-farm storage went from ubiquitous to 1% of the potato harvest. Delhi went from 18 
sharply seasonal potato consumption (from fresh harvest) to multi-season availability and 65% of 19 
consumption from cold-storage potatoes mainly from Agra. Rural brokers were sidelined by the 20 
cold storages themselves becoming the main locus of intermediation with urban wholesalers 21 
coming to buy potatoes from farmers at the storages. 22 
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Second, there has been a proliferation of “outsourced agricultural services” in the form of 1 
MSMEs providing combine services for small rice farmers in China (Zhang et al. 2017) and 2 
Myanmar (Belton 2017), and cotton farmers in Peru (Escobal et al. 2000). These are mobile 3 
teams equipped with combines go from farm to farm and province to province. They provide 4 
speedy, skilled service that compensates for small farmers’ lack of the ability to buy their own 5 
machine, or the skill and time to rent their own machine. Moreover, the capacity of the machines 6 
is typically much larger than local owned or rental machines, so that the harvesting and threshing 7 
can be done quickly, and in a timely way for higher market prices before the glut. An analogous 8 
service is performed by MSMEs called “sprayer traders” in mango zones of Indonesia and the 9 
Philippines; teams of skilled laborers equipped with sprayers and vehicles and ladders go from 10 
farm to farm and prune, spray, harvest, sort, and market mangoes for demanding urban and 11 
export markets (dela Cruz et al. 2010; Qanti et al. 2017).  12 
Third, Minten et al. (2016) show that the value chain of teff (the leading cereal in Ethiopia) 13 
has developed rapidly to serve the Addis Ababa market over the past decade. There has been a 14 
proliferation of MSME mills-cum-retailers and rapid transformation all along the supply chain. 15 
The recent development of the teff value chain was found to be driven overall by significant 16 
growth in Addis and increase in incomes (with a doubling of income and a doubling of teff 17 
expenditure in the past 10 years); by the increased opportunity cost of women’s time (saving 18 
time cleaning and milling teff and making enjera (teff pancake)); by the diffusion of cell phones, 19 
improvements in roads and reduction of transport costs (in part driven by mass aggregate 20 
investment by wholesalers in trucks), and provision of teff government extension services.  21 
The development of the teff value chain was in turn correlated with (1) increasing adoption of 22 
modern inputs (chemical fertilizers, improved varieties of seed, and herbicides) by farmers, 23 
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especially by those living close to urban centers; (2) rising quality demands and important shifts 1 
from the cheap red varieties to the more expensive white teff varieties, with concomitant 2 
increases in productivity due to the uptake of improved varieties; (3) increasing consumer 3 
willingness to pay for convenience in urban areas, with the rapid emergence of one-stop retail 4 
shops that provide sales, cleaning, milling, and transport services, as well as a sizable food 5 
service industry; and (4) declining share of the margins of rural–urban marketing, urban 6 
distribution, and milling in the final retail prices of teff, indicating improved marketing 7 
efficiency over time. Traditionally, and still in rural areas and small cities and towns outside 8 
Addis, consumers buy teff as a grain, clean it at home, have it custom milled, and then prepare 9 
enjera at home. These practices have changed in Addis over the past decade, with a decline in 10 
custom milling and in cleaning grain at home. Instead, consumers are buying teff flour or enjera, 11 
driving a sharp increase (nearly 50 percent) of teff mills and retail outlets in the neighborhoods. 12 
 13 
(c) Disintermediation with late-in-stage transitional and modern supply chains 14 
 As market volume and investment capacity permit large enterprises to develop (anywhere 15 
along the chains, from inputs, to farming, to wholesale, to logistics, to retail), these firms have a 16 
tendency to try to “cut out the intermediaries” and sell or buy directly. This is done mainly to cut 17 
costs. This is termed “dis-intermediation.” This is associated with the “transitional” and 18 
“modern” stages of the supply chain. For example, larger wholesalers based in towns and cities 19 
have in India gone well along the path of eliminating use of traditional village brokers in order to 20 
buy directly from rice and potato farmers (Reardon et al. 2012). Supermarkets in Central 21 
America have shifted to buying directly from agribusiness firms for crops in which the latter are 22 
engaged (e.g., pineapples, bananas) (Berdegué et al. 2005).  23 
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Supermarkets and processing companies also have a tendency for “re-intermediation” - to 1 
shift from procurement on the spot market to use, as much as possible, of specialized, dedicated 2 
wholesalers to procure and market (Reardon and Berdegué, 2002). They are charged with 3 
applying quality and safety standards of the chains or processor, selecting regular suppliers such 4 
as farmers or supplier villages or coops who can meet the standards, and collecting or marketing 5 
exclusively for the chain or processor. An example is large rice millers in China relying on 6 
specialized agents to market their branded packaged rice (Reardon et al. 2012), and supermarkets 7 
in Latin America and Africa and China using dedicated wholesalers to source produce according 8 
to the private quality standards of the chains (Reardon and Berdegué, 2002 for Latin America, 9 
Weatherspoon and Reardon 2003 for South Africa, and Hu et al. 2004 and Michelson et al. 2017 10 
for China). 11 
   12 
4.2.5. Per segment, de-concentration then concentration then re-concentration 13 
In short local supply chains to small towns or rural areas, the market volume does not permit 14 
the emergence of large-scale firms. At a micro level, for a firm to attain scale, potential market 15 
sales as well as investment capacity are needed. The potential market can come from increase in 16 
scale of demand due to consumer income increases; or access to a secondary or mega city that 17 
represents large agglomerated demand. These large effective demands can be supplied by many 18 
small firms and farms. But if the technology is characterized by economies of scale, this 19 
encourages firms to invest in scale. This is typically the case with processing, and where 20 
transport and warehouse and cold chain are needed, with wholesale. As the need for coordination 21 
and inventory control rise with marketing scale, and bargaining power in procurement with 22 
buying scale, there can also be economies of scale and scope in retail. 23 
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At the segment level, if competition is only on cost (hence the “commodity” stage of the 1 
product cycle) and the large firms or farms are more efficient than the small, concentration can 2 
occur. This is often observed in the “modern stage” of supply chain development, at least for 3 
some segments. In those segments there will be concentration. In others the structure may stay 4 
fragmented for some time. For example, in the modern portion of the dairy sector in Zambia, 5 
small farms could be selling to large processors who sell some of their output to supermarkets 6 
(Neven et al. 2016). Or, in a late “transitional stage,” in long supply chains with some 7 
disintermediation (such as town-based wholesalers competing out of the market the small rural 8 
brokers, but selling on to many small urban millers and mainly small retailers; this is the case of 9 
the Bangladesh rice supply chain (Minten et al. 2013).  10 
Reardon (2015) conceives of concentration change as a “J curve” with three stages that 11 
roughly coincide with the stages of modernization of the food system. 12 
The first stage is the high fragmentation that characterizes the traditional supply chains. As an 13 
initial move to serve incipient urban markets and build economies of scale and obviate what are 14 
perceived as “exploitative traders”, governments sometimes introduce parastatals in this stage, 15 
especially for basic grains. These partially concentrate the wholesale and retail segments, hence 16 
providing the leftmost part of the J of concentration over time.  17 
The second stage occurs after market liberalization and the privatization of the parastatals. 18 
The vacuum thus left, as well as the propitious logistics and demand side conditions that also 19 
induce the development of the transitional stage of supply chains (public road investments, 20 
urbanization, income increases), induce the proliferation of MSMEs in the segments of the 21 
supply chain. This is what we termed the “quiet revolution in food systems” discussed above.  22 
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 The third stage is the steep rightmost part of the J, and is the re-concentration that occurs as 1 
competition among MSMEs has it that some emerge as winners and expand, and FDI 2 
liberalization and other investment regulation relaxation (such as “de-reservation” in India, 3 
Reardon and Minten 2011), induce investment by large private processing, wholesale/logistics, 4 
supermarket chains, and fast-food chains. This has involved, especially since the early/mid 5 
1990s, waves of diffusion of supermarkets and large processors in particular (Reardon et al. 6 
2003, Reardon and Timmer 2012).  Much of this started as regional or global FDI, and then has 7 
generated intense domestic capital investments.  8 
 In the second and third stage of transformation of the food system there is “co-evolution” of 9 
the segments. In the second, “transitional,” stage, there is both spontaneous private sector co-10 
evolution as wholesalers and processors proliferate to serve the burgeoning urban retail sector. 11 
There is also conscious public intervention, as municipal governments construct public 12 
wholesale markets (witness the diffusion of those in the 1970s and 1980s in the first wave 13 
countries, 1980s and 1990s in the second wave, and 1990s and 2000s in the third wave countries, 14 
mainly in Asia such as China and Vietnam and India, but also incipiently but in a limited way in 15 
Africa).  16 
 In the third, “modern” stage, private sector coevolution is intensified and at large scale. The 17 
importance of coevolution is that it accelerates the system transformation and raises entry 18 
requirements for small firms that want to compete either in the commodity market (on cost) or in 19 
quality differentiated products. Supermarkets tend to source from large processors so as to 20 
reduce procurement transaction costs and make sure of quality and eventually food safety. An 21 
example of this is relative concentration of reliance by supermarkets in China on large scale rice 22 
mills (Reardon et al. 2012b). Large processors target product differentiation to the requests of 23 
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supermarkets, such as for milk and juice products by Nestle and others in Brazil (Farina et al. 1 
2005). Large logistic and wholesale multinationals as well as processors “follow” supermarket 2 
chains into new countries, in “follow sourcing”, as with Baakavor following Tesco into China 3 
(Reardon et al. 2007).  4 
Relative to the traditional stages, the transitional and modern stages have occasioned the most 5 
“conduct” change in the food system – with new technologies, organizational forms, and new 6 
institutions of private standards and contracts. We turn to this conduct change next. 7 
   8 
5. Transformation of Food systems: focus on conduct (organizational, institutional, and 9 
technological) changes 10 
5.1. Endogenous transfer, co-evolution, and innovators’ strategic system design 11 
At the risk of over-simplifying, in the past 200 years since the industrial revolution in Britain, 12 
and the agriculture technology and food system organizational revolutions in the US and 13 
Western Europe, the bulk of basic innovations occurred first in US and Western Europe and then 14 
been transferred and adapted in developing Asia, Africa, and Latin America in the past 50 years. 15 
(This is of course not to forget that that industrial revolution itself reposed on a series of 16 
innovations from much earlier mainly from East and West Asia. The compass and the horizontal 17 
loom from China serving as the basic innovations at the foundation of the mercantile and 18 
industrial revolutions in the “West” are examples enough.)  19 
Key innovations in agriculture technology (such as chemical fertilizer, hybrid maize, tractors, 20 
pesticides, genetic modification, and so on), in processing and wholesale and transport 21 
(motorized mills, trucks, refrigeration, freeze drying, and so on), and in organization (chain 22 
stores, self-service retail, supermarkets, private standards) emerged in the US and Western 23 
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Europe as their industries and then food systems urbanized, diversified, and passed from local 1 
food systems (extremely similar to traditional food systems in developing countries now), to 2 
transitional and then recently to modern food systems.  3 
These “West-origin” innovations were transferred and adapted in the past 50 years in the 4 
spatial and product waves we discuss above, as demand side and policy conditions grew 5 
receptive and propitious for their transfer in Asia, Africa, and Latin America. The channels of 6 
transfer included: (1) massive waves of foreign direct investment (FDI) by agribusiness, 7 
processors, logistics and wholesale, and retailers; (2) investments by local entrepreneurs and 8 
public sector in innovations from the US or Western Europe they observed in FDI activities or on 9 
a business trip or university education, or read about on the internet. Of course, not all of the 10 
basic innovations even during the 50 years were being transferred initially from the “West.” For 11 
example, there was basic rice breeding innovations in and from China during that period. 12 
 The local private entrepreneurs and public sector in developing countries as well as 13 
innovating “Western” companies diffused those initial innovations, adapting and modifying them 14 
to local conditions. Just as in the “West” the initial innovations had developed as packages of 15 
inter-dependent innovations (such as the example of Tyson above where genetic variation, 16 
contracting, private standards, piecing and cooling or freezing, long distance transport, and 17 
marketing in supermarkets), the transfer of one or more innovations, in technology or 18 
organization, brought with it the cluster of other related innovations.  19 
 Zilberman et al. (2017) examine the proactive links between an innovator’s innovation and 20 
his/her “implementation” of that innovation, to generate and protect an initial advantage and 21 
profit arising from the innovation’s superiority (in cost or quality or safety) to the technology or 22 
product it supplants. They present the structure and the conduct of the supply chain based on that 23 
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innovation, as endogenous, constructed. Again, the Tyson chicken example serves; Tyson 1 
innovated with frozen or chilled chicken parts and needed to produce these massively to be 2 
competitive and supplant frozen whole chickens sold by their competitors. The initial product 3 
cum technology innovation was “implemented” by Tyson choosing to select and impose new 4 
breeds of chicken, institute contracts with out-growers, invest in large scale centralized 5 
processing, and contract with specialized large scale logistics firms.  6 
In that sense then, the food system changes we observe, especially in the modern phase, are 7 
emanations of the strategies of a large number of innovating companies. These strategies are sets 8 
of technologies and institutions and organizations chosen to implement the innovations. But they 9 
are also “induced” innovation in other companies to help them implement the innovation and 10 
thus also profit in a coevolution schema. An example is given below where Nestle, having 11 
innovated ultra high temperature (UHT) milk processing technologies and products in Western 12 
Europe, transferred this to large scale processing FDI in Brazil; at the same time and of course 13 
linked, Tetrapak, with its vacuum packaging innovation, set up in Brazil to provide packaging to 14 
Nestle and others (Farina et al. 2005). For efficiency of the set of UHT plus packaging plus large 15 
scale manufacture of both, farmers needed to contract with Nestle and implement private 16 
standards pertaining to levels of protein sediment, bacteria, and fat in the milk they delivered.  17 
Understanding both the role of public research and private innovators, and the linkages 18 
between technological, organizational, and institutional innovations in developing food systems, 19 
is central to our analysis of transforming food systems. Below we explore in more detail these 20 
innovations born out as changes in the system.  21 
 22 
5.2. Organization and institutional change  23 
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Organizational change can be analyzed in terms of “markets and hierarchies” in the words of 1 
Williamson (1981). Actors can choose to transact via the uncoordinated spot market, such as 2 
brokers coming to a wholesale market to buy and sell, or via some degree of coordinated or 3 
hierarchized market. An intermediate or transitional form could be the use by a supermarket 4 
chain of the specialized/dedicated wholesalers noted above, as agents to buy or sell, and in doing, 5 
implement its quality and safety standards and price points. A full form could be a tight contract 6 
where standards and price are specified to suppliers of the supermarket or processor, usually as a 7 
direct, disintermediated relation.  8 
As the food system moves from traditional to transitional to modern, there is a shift 9 
organizationally from spot to transitional to fully coordinated. This tends to occur fastest in 10 
grains, oil seeds, and processed products, and next fastest in fresh meat, and slowest in fish and 11 
produce. Thus, in Mexico for example, for grains and meat one can find fully coordinated supply 12 
chains from farmers to supermarkets, with (1) branding and packaging; (2) direct purchase from 13 
suppliers or special agents, (3) distribution centers, (4) public and private standards, and (5) 14 
some contracts. But for fresh produce, one finds supermarkets relying on a mix of: (1) spot 15 
market relations in wholesale markets, (2) off-market specialized wholesalers such as Pedraza, 16 
and (3) direct contracts with large agribusinesses such as Mr. Lucky for vegetables (Reardon et 17 
al. 2007b).   18 
Finally, linked with the above organizational change is the three-staged emergence of 19 
standards as “institutional innovations”.  20 
First, in the early stages of commoditization in national markets and international trade, there 21 
is the gradual emergence in developing countries in the 1970s/1980s of public standards of 22 
quality (in particular of grain quality) to allow for long-distance trade with low transaction costs 23 
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and risk, and then phytosanitary public standards to allow for animal and horticulture product 1 
movements over borders. 2 
Second, with product differentiation, rise of non-staple consumption, and modernization of 3 
supply chains, private standards for quality and safety began to emerge in the 1990s and 2000s. 4 
These were especially manifest in export operations and processing sectors, with gradual 5 
emergence in perishables for supermarkets. Usually these were imposed by supermarket chains, 6 
large processors, and fast food chains, and their procurement agents, to reduce losses in 7 
processing, increase shelf life, control quality and consistency, and assure safety (Reardon et al. 8 
1999; Henson and Reardon, 2005; Swinnen 2007). Examples include Nestle’s quality 9 
certification for grated coconut in Brazil (Farina et al. 2000) and potato variety specification for 10 
French fry production by McCain’s for McDonald’s in Argentina (Ghezan et al. 2002). 11 
Third, with further development of street vendors of prepared foods, formal restaurants, and 12 
fast food chains, and domestic trade in perishables, gradually governments have instituted public 13 
food safety regulations for retail and food service (for example, in China, Jia and Jukes, 2013). In 14 
some cases there is strong argument for economic and health impacts of regulation but 15 
implementation is difficult (such as in the case of aflatoxins in maize and peanuts in Africa, see 16 
Khlangwiset and Wu, 2010). 17 
Technology innovations have been generally necessary – in every segment of the food system 18 
– to accompany and implement the structure and organizational/institutional transformations 19 
noted above. We turn to these innovations next. 20 
 21 
5.3. Technological change per segment – upstream and midstream/downstream  22 
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In this section we discuss the technology changes that occurred as the food system 1 
transformation occurred, and thus by extension the impact of technology research in IARCS and 2 
NARS and private companies on that transformation. We start with upstream, then look 3 
downstream. Within each, we start with commoditization-facilitation technologies (that get costs 4 
down), and then go to product differentiation-facilitation technologies (that help produce other 5 
attributes like quality and safety).  6 
 7 
5.3.1. Farm product breeding technologies and supply chain transformation 8 
Breeding research and thus variety change have been fundamental forces in fueling the massive 9 
“throughput” of feedstock in the transforming food system. R&D supply chains for new seeds 10 
and other inputs depend critically on a combination of the development of private seed markets 11 
as well as private and public sector breeding of improved seeds to allow intensification by farms.  12 
The contribution can be thought through along the lines of the product lifecycle in three 13 
stages: (1) the product traditionally or as the result of an innovation emerges as a “niche 14 
product”; (2) if there is scope for wide demand, firms focus on innovations for cost reduction and 15 
develop it into a “commoditized bulk product” at a much greater volume; (3) as competition 16 
drives down per unit profit, innovating firms move to the stage of “differentiated products”, 17 
differentiating by variety cum quality or safety or unit size or some production attribute such as 18 
labor rights or environmental sustainability. Each of the latter is then a candidate to repeat the 19 
cycle of commoditization then differentiation.  20 
There are two ways we can link product demand change (diet change) over a product cycle, 21 
and food system transformation, to agricultural research, in particular breeding, here. In the next 22 
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section we discuss a broader range of technology change related to other aspects of supply chain 1 
change. 2 
The first path has received the most attention, and that mostly for grains: the focus has been 3 
on breeding for drought or flooding and disease resistance and adaptation to small farmer 4 
conditions. The best known example is of course the Green Revolution and the system of NARS 5 
and IARCs that emerged to form R&D supply chains of new seeds demand by poor people who 6 
wanted and needed to intensify production on small plots (Lipton with Longhurst 1989; Hayami 7 
and Ruttan 1971, Binswanger 1978). Another example is the shift from local variety to broadly 8 
diffused commodity mainly due to agroecological adaptability crossed with breeding to make the 9 
product of increasingly wide diffusion. An example of the former is McCann’s (2000) account of 10 
flint and then eventually dent maizes spreading to zones of Africa where formerly sorghum and 11 
millet had been produced. A third example of the latter is the breeding of maize to fit drier areas, 12 
such as was done by Zaria in Northern Nigeria in the 1980s (Byerlee and Eicher, 1997).  13 
The second path links product cycle, breeding, and commoditization market development. 14 
This second path has received relatively little attention, although the little received is mostly for 15 
grains.  16 
The first variant of this second path is intra-product. It has focused mainly on breeding for 17 
quality and processability, transport, and shelf-life/storage characteristics. A first good example 18 
of “commoditization” is the shift from traditional flint to bred dent maize in output composition 19 
as the industrial maize milling industry took off mid-1800s in the US, matching the emergence of 20 
purchased-processed foods by US consumers in the second half of the 19
th
 century. Investment in 21 
the establishment of a maize processing industry in the second half of the 1800s “induced” a shift 22 
in the farm segment from the traditional flint maize to the new dent maize (with high soft starch 23 
38 
 
better for milling than the flint varieties). At the same time, the breeding of the dent maize (by 1 
the Reids, farmers in Illinois) in the 1850s, initiated a dent maize seed industry (R&D supply 2 
chain as well as seed breeding and multiplication and sale). This “induced” a shift in the farm 3 
segment to shift from flint to dent maize. One could thus see the initial “shock” or inducement as 4 
coming from the seed segment or from the processing segment, and having linkage impacts 5 
either downstream or upstream on farms. In fact the two shocks were a confluence of changes, as 6 
the processing industry needed the dent maize attributes to be produced to spur the mill sectors’ 7 
growth, and the dent seed industry needed the downstream farms and mills to demand dent maize 8 
seed and grain.  9 
Research attention in developing countries has recently been directed to the above trend 10 
linking grain varieties, urban supply chain growth, and milling industry transformation. One 11 
example is teff variety differentiation for quality for the urban market of Addis Ababa (Minten et 12 
al. 2016). Another is a similar trend for rice varieties in Bangladesh (Minten et al. 2013).  13 
A second good example of breeding for “commoditization” in the food system is from 14 
Goodhue and Rausser (2003). They analyzed technology change during supply chain elongation 15 
and commoditization in the broiler industry  in the United States. Firms first identified the 16 
attribute consumers wanted: chilled rather than  frozen  chicken  meat.  The  industry  then  17 
innovated  with  ice-bath  transport of the meat,  plus genetic improvement of chickens so that  18 
meat  would  be less porous  to water penetration and would stay chilled without becoming 19 
waterlogged. These innovations allowed  broiler  meat to be shipped  further  and thus reach a 20 
larger market.  Firms coordinated with farmers via contracts specifying the use of that  specific 21 
type of chicken. Goodhue and Rausser also cite a similar case with hogs. In both cases, the value 22 
chains transformed quickly in terms of technology change, the use of contracts, and market size. 23 
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 A third example goes beyond commoditization and depicts breeding for product 1 
differentiation in produce supply chains. The example is kiwi fruit. Originally a local niche 2 
product in mountainous areas of China, it was then commoditized (first by New Zealand firms 3 
then by others) at a global scale, abetted by supermarket demand for year-round produce starting 4 
in the 1970s-1990s. The path was first through the diffusion of green kiwis to a number of 5 
countries (Italy, California, and even then to China as cash crop); then it was differentiated by 6 
the breeding of a sweeter “golden kiwi” by the New Zealanders, which at first was a luxury niche 7 
product and now is being diffused globally and entering the commodity phase, such as with mass 8 
plantings in California and recently in China. 9 
  10 
5.3.2. Non-seed input supply chain technology change to support farming intensification 11 
Supply chain development, urbanization, and local industrialization or access to imported 12 
external inputs tend to be correlated. That drives down the cost of capital inputs (irrigation 13 
equipment, seeds, fertilizer, insecticides, herbicides, tractors and combines and sprayers), 14 
inducing their diffusion. Both the private sector and NARS have been deeply engaged in R&D 15 
over the past 150 years that have had fundamental effects on the quality and cost (and existence) 16 
of these inputs. Four examples of private sector R&D cum extension supply chains creating these 17 
innovations are of interest.  18 
 First, as labor costs rose in the US and the UK in the 1940s, herbicides were created by 19 
private companies in the UK and then government and private companies in the US and were 20 
used immediately to substitute for hand weeding. This innovation quickly diffused in the US 21 
over the 1940s to the 1990s (Swinton and van Deynze, 2017). Due to increases of labor costs in 22 
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developing regions, a parallel adoption of herbicides has occurred in waves similar to the system 1 
transformation waves from the 1970s to the 2010s (Haggblade et al. 2017).  2 
 Second, as demand for machine use in farming rose in the US in the first half of the 1800s as 3 
farms extensified and labor constraints appeared, the combine was invented by private parties in 4 
the US and Scotland. It diffused over the century, shifting from horse to steam to gas engine 5 
powered, with a string of innovations by companies such as John Deere. It was then adapted for 6 
small farms in the 1970s in Japan by Kubota, and from there diffused widely over developing 7 
Asia and into Africa in the subsequent decades.  8 
 Third, as demand for water in horticulture rose in Germany, Australia, Israel, and California 9 
from the 1860s to the 1960s, there were a series of innovations from clay to plastic tubing that 10 
came to be termed drip irrigation. Again, as with the innovations above, starting in the 1970s it 11 
was adapted and diffused to developing countries, innovations by companies like Netafim of 12 
Israel and then Jain Irrigation of India.  13 
Fourth, Notore Chemicals in Nigeria are a major supplier of agro inputs. They have developed 14 
a private system for training and input distribution in rural areas which uses local entrepreneurial 15 
residents (often youth) to be their sales agent and resident extension officer for farmers in rural 16 
communities all across Nigeria (Liverpool-Tasie et al. 2015).  Through this they are able to 17 
create brand recognition to address the problem of poor input quality in Nigeria while also 18 
leveraging the social capital of their sales agent to spread new technologies, learn of and meet 19 
farmers needs and enforce repayment if inputs are taken on credit. 20 
 21 
5.3.3. Post-farmgate technology change 22 
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While the great majority of attention in the research community has been focused on farm 1 
technology change as a facilitator of food system change, technological change occurring in off-2 
farm components of the food system  - input supply chains as well as the midstream and 3 
downstream of food supply chains - is as important as farm technology for the overall 4 
performance of the food system. Recall that the midstream and downstream segments together 5 
represent roughly 60% of the food system’s costs and value added.  6 
The drivers of post-farmgate technology change are similar to the farm technology points 7 
above. As with farm technologies, a gradual increase in wage rates combined with a decrease in 8 
physical capital prices (from local industrialization and imports) induced midstream and 9 
downstream capital intensification and productive capital upgrading.  Demand side factors such 10 
as demand for new products, new quality and safety attributes, and greater and more storable 11 
volumes also induced technology change. 12 
R&D supply chains to create and deliver the new off-farm technologies (embodied in a range 13 
of quasi fixed and variable capital inputs) noted below tended to develop along with investments 14 
in the post-farm and input value chain segments. This was “induced technological innovation.” 15 
These were sometimes started as basic science innovations in public research institutions and 16 
then there was a great deal of adaptation and innovation by private companies. Many were 17 
originally the inventions of individual inventors, or the fruit of R&D units of companies. Some 18 
innovations where all three of these, such as the cluster of inventions and improvements around 19 
freezers or tractors. 20 
As noted above, as in farm technologies, much of the initial innovation occurred earlier, in 21 
currently developed countries historically, and then was transferred and adapted to developing 22 
country supply chain situations. Or, it occurred in one more advanced setting recently and then 23 
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as it became possible or desirable, it was transferred to a less advanced setting. An example of 1 
this above was herbicides; invented in the US 40 years ago, recently China and India adopted 2 
them and worked up a large capacity for their production and now export them to Africa. The 3 
same can be said of vehicles; invented by Germans 130 years ago, one now sees second-hand 4 
Chinese petrol farm vehicles throughout Myanmar’s food supply chains. One also sees second-5 
generation Dutch or German milling equipment all over developing regions now. Alibaba.com 6 
sells all manner of post-harvest equipment from Chinese factories in many developing countries, 7 
much of it already adapted to smaller scale or tropical conditions by Japanese and Indian and 8 
Chinese innovations in the past two decades. 9 
 We provide several prominent illustrations below of post-farmgate technology innovation.  10 
Logistics. Innovations and investments in logistics have been fundamental to the rapid and 11 
recent elongation of the food system and the reduction of seasonality. The teff value chain 12 
transformation research in Ethiopia (Minten et al. 2016) shows a rapid shift from transport of teff 13 
by foot (head loads) to animal transport (donkey/horses, carts), to motorized transport, and then 14 
from small trucks of 4-5 tons to truck-trailers of 20 tons – a thousand years of transport change in 15 
a decade. Systems that had been relatively local switched to long distance commerce as 16 
combinations of large trucks and train lines combined to move potatoes from Northern to 17 
Southern India, abetted by potato varieties with tougher skins to transport further and store 18 
longer (das Gupta et al. 2010). Potato supply chains grew over a few decades from remote 19 
mountain areas to large cities across China (Gansu to Beijing by truck; Reardon et al. (2012); 20 
Gansu to Shanghai and Guangdong by rail; Zhang and Hu (2014). Some innovations have been 21 
surprising: in Myanmar in 2011, bus transport was privatized and liberalized. Bus lines 22 
proliferated and competed. One way they competed was by adding an iced cold shelf in the buses 23 
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for fish to be transported from aquaculture areas in the south to Mandalay in the north. This gave 1 
rise to nearly 200,000 tons of fish moved by small merchants via many buses (Belton et al. 2 
2017).  3 
Processing scale and agglomeration. In the shift from the transitional to modern stages, 4 
economies of scale of processing of output and feed and economies of agglomeration of farms 5 
and processing near consumption areas account for scale increase, technology change, and peri-6 
urban agglomeration of fish, pigs, and chicken. For example, aquaculture, in an early stage in 7 
Myanmar is mainly produced near and sold in the mega city (Belton et al. 2017). A similar thing 8 
is happening with poultry and hog production in developing regions. Their initial commercial 9 
production base is in small operations around cities. These tend to shift both structurally from 10 
scattered home enterprises to larger farms and integrated operations, and spatially to from 11 
scattered rural sites to agglomerated areas near the cities. In Thailand, the share of backyard pig 12 
farms dropped from 55% to 20% of pigs over 1993 to 2008; large chicken farms have grown 13 
from 39% to 57% of chickens over the same period (Poapongsakorn 2012). In China, backyard 14 
(small-scale) pig production was 95% of the market in 1985 and 27% in 2007 (Schneider 2011). 15 
There has been a concomitant rise of large processing firms for pigs and chickens, with location 16 
of large farms and large processing firms near the cities of China and Thailand, in a major shift 17 
away from scattered countryside operations in the 1990s and before. 18 
 Freezing and Packaging. As freezing and packaging technologies are transferred and 19 
adapted and investments made, there is often an elongation of supply chains from near cities to 20 
near areas with low cost natural resources. For example, with rapid development of the frozen 21 
fish industry, fish is increasingly shipped longer distances within countries; there is a massive 22 
flow of frozen fish from aquaculture areas in the South of China to Beijing, mainly developed in 23 
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the 2010s as an outgrowth of an initial export operation base (Bai et al. 2015). The same is 1 
happening with vegetables, with the rise of frozen vegetables shipped long distances (such as 2 
happened with potatoes in Argentina (Ghezan et al.  2002), and green vegetables and sweet corn 3 
in Chile (Milicivec et al. 1998).   4 
A similar change took place in dairy in Brazil in the 1980s and 1990s. There was a 5 
combination of four internationally-transferred technology and organizational innovations that 6 
led to a massive increase in milk consumption in Brazil in the 1990s, an increase in average dairy 7 
farm size and exit of the smallest farms, and a spatial shift from peri-urban production in the 8 
1980s to spatial concentration in cheap grain and forage zones far from the main cities in the 9 
1990s (Farina  et al. 2005):  10 
(1) Nestle and Parmalat intensively invested in Brazil in the late 1980s after liberalization of 11 
FDI, transferring large scale processing technology;  12 
(2) supermarket chains spread in the late 1980s and early 1990s with liberalization of retail 13 
FDI; they sought reduction of transaction costs in procurement, preferring larger milk 14 
processors, and long shelf life milk to introduce to consumers many of which did not yet have 15 
refrigerators;  16 
(3) UHT (ultra high temperature) treatment of milk (invented in Denmark in 1910) allows it to 17 
be stored at ambient temperatures if in vacuum packed containers;  18 
(4) the four layer vacuum packed container technology was invented in 1952 by Tetra Pak of 19 
Sweden; they invented this technology at first for the European market as milk demand had 20 
dramatically increased after WWII. Tetra Pak made it practicable to have UHT enter mass 21 
production. Tetra Pak heavily invested in packaging facilities in Brazil in the late 1980s and 22 
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1990s. This served the developing dairy and juice markets with long shelf-life packaging and 1 
vacuum packing;  2 
(5) the result was widespread diffusion of UHT in Tetra Pak containers: Farina et al. show 3 
that UHT milks went from 10% to 90% of milk consumed in Brazil just in the decade of the 4 
1990s.  5 
Extrusion for feed and noodles. Demand for more processed foods induced transfer and 6 
adaptation of food processing technologies. Feed processing plants adapted new technologies for 7 
extrusion of pellets, and noodle factories, extrusion techniques. This has led to extremely rapid 8 
even sudden diffusion of pelleted, floating feed in Bangladesh aquaculture, that itself expanded 9 
25 fold in three decades (Hernandez et al. 2017), and diffusion of Japanese study ramen noodles 10 
manufactured by Indofoods in Nigeria (Liverpool-Tasie et al. 2017).  11 
Traceability and inventory and safety monitoring technologies. Demand for time saving in 12 
shopping induced transfer of retail “technologies” and organization, like supermarkets and chain 13 
stores.  An example is the adoption of bar codes and electric scanners for inventory control. Food 14 
safety concerns among urban consumers of perishables and rural and urban consumers of maize 15 
and peanut products induced food safety cum waste control measures like pasteurization of milk, 16 
addition of aflatoxin binders in stored maize by traders and millers, and humidity measuring 17 
devices and grain driers by traders and warehouse owners. 18 
 19 
6. Food system transformation’s performance – on waste, food supply costs and quality, 20 
and impacts on actor incomes 21 
Above we have laid out the first two of the three logical steps in this paper – to wit, the impact of 22 
research (particularly in technology), controlling for other factors  like diet change, income 23 
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growth, and urbanization, and food system transformation. In this section we will lay out the 1 
main elements of the third point, the impact of transformation on performance. Several points 2 
stand out.  3 
First, it is nearly tautological that the expansion in volume of the food system, given that it is 4 
80% domestic, has benefited small and medium farmers, as those constitute the bulk of 5 
producers for domestic markets in the three regions. Moreover, the strong tipping of the product 6 
composition toward non-staples, which are usually higher value per ton or hectare or day, mean 7 
that at least the farmers who have been able to diversify are able to gain from that shift. The 8 
literature is full of examples of medium-large net income increases of farmers shifting from 9 
grains to fish or horticulture or dairy or poultry.  10 
Second, the available evidence shows that it tends to be the upper tier or half of small farmers 11 
who can access the urban markets and the non-grain markets, as they require placement near 12 
enough to roads, and some water access. At first the excluded must shrink as supply chains get 13 
longer and longer. But then as the chains modernize and increasingly demand quality and safety, 14 
those farmers reached must make basic investments in those attributes and that narrows the 15 
winners. The evidence shows that small farmers can still be included, but tend to not be the 16 
hinterland or asset-poor farmers (for a review, see Reardon et al. 2009). 17 
Where food industry firms need small farmers, and the latter suffer from idiosyncratic market 18 
failures and asset constraints, with modernization, some food industry firms supply “resource 19 
provision contracts” (Austin 1981 and Gow and Swinnen 1998) that are reminiscent of the earlier 20 
tied output-credit market arrangements of traders, that are largely disappearing (for Africa case 21 
see Adjognon et al. 2017; for Asia see Reardon et al. 2014). 22 
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Third, the available evidence shows that urban consumers have greatly benefitted from the 1 
quiet revolution, such as in the potato example where potato prices dropped and potato access 2 
deseasonalized with cold storage proliferation in India (das Gupta et al. 2010; Minten et al. 3 
2014), or deseasonalization from longer and wider array of potato supply chains to Beijing.  4 
It also appears that from the cost and quality (and increasingly safety, if private standards are 5 
met) viewpoint, the modern transformation also benefitted consumers, eventually with lower 6 
prices compared with traditional markets, as both the supply chains modernized and 7 
supermarkets shifted to modern procurement systems. For the case of Delhi, see Minten et al. 8 
(2010), and an overall review, Minten and Reardon (2008). 9 
The gains were most evidenced in processed and semi-processed foods, which are about 85% 10 
of what developing country consumers buy. The economies of scale and scope in these foods 11 
have been realized with the transformation of the food system. Of course that food security silver 12 
cloud has the dark lining that some processed foods contribute to bad health outcomes such as 13 
obesity and diabetes. But the bulk of processed foods and other time saving devices have positive 14 
consequences of liberation of women’s time for education, labor market participation, and child 15 
care (for Nigeria, see Liverpool-Tasie et al. 2016b). 16 
Fourth, with both the quiet and the modern food system revolutions, we note that there has 17 
been an increase in volumes and length of the supply chains. One thus moves away from small 18 
“niche” local markets to nationally integrated and often more efficient markets. This leads to 19 
better price integration but also to a marketing system with relatively smaller marketing costs (as 20 
shown in cereal market analysis in Ethiopia, for example; see Minten et al. 2014). 21 
Fifth, both from the high value diversification products being produced, and the large amount 22 
of activity post-farm gate occasioned by longer and more developed supply chains, there is a 23 
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great deal of rural nonfarm employment linked to food supply chains generated by the 1 
transformation. There is growing evidence that women and youths are especially benefitted as 2 
these are low entry barrier jobs in transport, commerce, food preparation, and small scale 3 
processing (for Africa, see Tschirley et al., 2016). 4 
 Finally, while there are general estimates of food losses and waste along supply chains (from 5 
farm to consumer) in developing countries put at roughly 20%-30% for cereals and pulses and 6 
meat and milk and fish, 40% for roots and tubers, and 50% for fruits and vegetables  by FAO 7 
(summarized in FAO 2011).  8 
However, with the caveat that comparisons of loss and waste measures are rife with 9 
challenges due to different measurement methods and inadequate information (Affognon et al.; 10 
2015), most systematic survey based studies of actual actors in the supply chains tend to have 11 
much lower figures than the FAO estimates. An example is a unique “stacked survey” based 12 
loss/waste measurement approach (Minten et al. 2016b and Reardon et al. 2012) that included 13 
details on waste in each segment of the value chains of potatoes and rice in China, India, and 14 
Bangladesh. They found only about 5% loss/waste over the whole supply chain for potato 15 
(excluding consumer level waste) and about 1% for rice. Kaminski and Christaensen (2014) used 16 
national level representative surveys of farm households for farmers estimates of post harvest 17 
losses in Malawi, Uganda, and Tanzania, and found a range of 1.4% to 5.9%, much lower than 18 
the post-harvest loss estimate of 8% for grains by FAO (2011). They also found that the areas of 19 
loss were concentrated among 20% of farms, that were in hotter and humid areas, with less 20 
market access (which for us means less developed food systems, in hinterland zones). Lipton 21 
(1982) in India had had similar findings, and at that time similarly questioned the then extent 22 
FAO estimates of 30-50% loss in grains.  23 
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Sheahan and Barrett (2017) contend that it is worthwhile, however, to analyze cost effective 1 
measures reduce loss and waste, but argue that pre-harvest actions (such as improved varietals) 2 
or chemical sprays and IPM for fields or storage and hermetic technologies (bags and silos) to 3 
store more effectively may be warranted, especially in view of some especially problematic loss 4 
and food safety problem generators, such as aflatoxins in maize and peanuts (Wu et al. 2011). 5 
But Sheahan and Barrett note that we should bear in mind the tradeoffs that farmers consider in 6 
terms of health and yields and other attributes. They also note that there has been very little 7 
empirical research on the effectiveness and adoption of these techniques. Bellemare et al. (2017) 8 
also argue that measures of food waste are conceptually flawed and have led to a large over-9 
estimate of waste in food systems, which is corroborated by the emerging empirical evidence 10 
about this.  11 
 12 
7. Implications for the agricultural research community and food systems scholars  13 
There are several key implications of our analysis of the pathways of transformation of food 14 
systems for agricultural research strategies of the IARCs and NARS.  15 
First, we showed that the food system – the cluster of three sets of supply chains, of inputs, 16 
outputs, and upstream and downstream technology R&D - is transforming relatively suddenly, 17 
rapidly, and profoundly. It is fair to say that the basics of research strategy and priorities were 18 
laid out several decades ago when the food system was deeply different from today, and are due 19 
for basic adjustments to match a radically different new reality. 25 years ago, demand was 20 
mostly for grains, farm households were little engaged in markets as sellers or buyers, supply 21 
chains were just emerging and urban market share was tiny; the only modern market was in the 22 
export sector, local markets were still just traditional. Today, about two-thirds of local demand 23 
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and thus food systems are in non-staples as consumer demand has diversified way beyond basic 1 
grains, into meat and fish (and thus derived demand for feed-grains too), edible oils, dairy, fruits, 2 
and vegetables. Within grains, there has been a strong shift toward higher quality cereals. Urban 3 
demand is now about half to three-quarters of the market that farmers face, and the needs of 4 
those markets become paramount to farmers trying to increase their incomes to exit poverty. 5 
Domestic markets are rapidly transitioning and even modernizing; consumers and agribusinesses 6 
and food industry firms are proliferating in every region, and are seeking from farmers greater 7 
quality, safety, consistency, shelf life, and lower seasonality, and competitive prices. 60% of the 8 
consumer price of food, an indicator of food security, is now formed by post-farm-gate actors, 9 
the wholesalers, processors, logistics firms, retailers. They, and their upstream counterparts in 10 
input supply chains, have now become as important as farmers in determining national food 11 
security. 12 
Second, IARCs and NARS have a strong vested interest in researching, understanding, and 13 
taking into account the whole food system and its transformation, adapting their strategies, plans, 14 
and choice and design of innovations in technologies and products. This also includes 15 
understanding the changing government policies, as well as private sector institutions (such as 16 
private standards) and procurement system and marketing organization. This is important for 17 
several reasons. Opportunities and bottlenecks along all three sets of supply chains determine the 18 
potential success of IARC/NARS innovations in the farming segment. Emerging requirements of 19 
the changing food system – in terms of product types, quality and safety attributes, shelf life, 20 
cost, consistency, seasonality, volumes, and so on - should influence priorities for IARC/NARS 21 
innovations.  This will help to determine whether innovations in farm technology and products 22 
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lead to profitable marketed output by farmers, and thus ultimately, whether farmers will have the 1 
incentive to adopt new technologies.  2 
Third, we have shown that the great majority of the food system’s structure, conduct, and 3 
performance are determined by the innovations, investments, and behavior (technology, buying, 4 
and selling choices) of the private sector. This includes the emergence to extreme importance to 5 
food systems both the vast numbers of micro, small, and medium enterprises (MSMEs) that have 6 
emerged in the “quiet revolution,” and the powerful agribusiness firms, processors, logistics and 7 
wholesale companies, and supermarket chains that have become ubiquitous and important in 8 
their emerging dominance of urban food economies and input supply chains. The food system 9 
now is a powerful, dynamic locomotive that is growing and moving and changing driven nearly 10 
exclusively by the decisions and investments of the private sector – the supermarket chains, the 11 
large processors, the big wholesale and logistic firms, the agribusiness firms, as well as the 10’s 12 
of thousands of MSME’s, both farms and off-farm segments, that are making massive aggregate 13 
investments upstream and downstream in the system. 14 
IARCs and NARS innovations need a supply chain to implement the innovations they 15 
generate. The upstream innovation is the beginning, not the end, of the process. The private 16 
sector in the food system is the centerpiece of the supply chain that delivers that upstream 17 
innovation. It is essential that IARCs/NARS understand the strategies, behavior, and needs of 18 
these two powerful sets of private sector actors, as the latter are essentially and in practical terms 19 
in charge of the direction that the entire food system.  25 years ago the private sector in the food 20 
system could be just a sidelight and “specialized” issue at the margin of food system thinking 21 
and agricultural research strategies: by becoming the dominant, central player in the food system, 22 
the private sector cannot be relegated to just a potentially interesting group to consult and 23 
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observe at the edges. It is now at the center. It is now the group that decides what systems and 1 
structures will market and implement the innovations of technologies and products generated by 2 
the IARC/NARS. The ability of the latter to understand, adapt to, selectively partner with, the 3 
private sector, will in the next decades be an important part of determining the performance of 4 
IARC/NARS innovations. 5 
Fourth, the public research community needs to understand and act on the importance of 6 
research on the off-farm components of the food system. Research on and productivity of 7 
processing, packaging, logistics, and commerce technologies have equal weight in the 8 
performance of the food system relative to the farm sector, and investment in research and 9 
development (R&D) value chains for these technologies and value chains for the inputs to these 10 
segments need a much higher profile in the context of the transformed food system where post 11 
farm segments occupy 40-70% of value added. An argument for post-farm-gate research (that it 12 
allows reduction of marketing margins in value chains to improve efficiency in the value chain) 13 
is usually a win-win for consumers as well as for producers. Moreover, returns on research 14 
(RoR) at the farm level clearly depend on concomitant innovations in the supply chain to supply 15 
inputs for or market the output of the innovation.  16 
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Table 1: Domestic food supply quantities (approximation of consumption by 
disappearance) & composition in millions of tons  & population 
  1970 1990 2013 
Africa food supply quantity (ton/capita/yr) 0.46 0.49 0.59 
population (in millions) 339m 581m 995m 
Africa total domestic food supply  156 285 587 
Imports into Africa, tons (share of total 
domestic food supply) 
11 (7%) 42 (15%) 123 (21%) 
Exports from Africa, tons (share of total 
domestic supply) 
17 (11%) 15 (5%) 39 (7%) 
Staples: cereals (% total) 44 (28%) 84 (29%) 150 (26%) 
Staples: roots & tubers (not potato) (% total) 34 (21%) 53 (19%) 116 (20%) 
Non-staples (% in total) 79 (50%) 148 (52%) 320 (55%) 
Asia food supply quantity (ton/capita/yr) 0.37 0.43 0.65 
population  2.07b 3.13b 4.26b 
Asia total domestic food supply  758 1,357 2,786 
Imports into Asia, tons (share of total 
domestic food supply) 
70 (9%) 176 (13%) 507 (18%) 
Exports from Asia, tons (share of total 
domestic supply) 
30 (4%) 90 (7%) 284 (10%) 
Staples: cereals (% total) 
300 
(40%) 
507 (37%) 663 (24%) 
Staples: roots & tubers (not potato) (% total) 
111 
(15%) 
87 (6%) 70 (3%) 
Non-staples (% in total) 
348 
(46%) 
762 (56%) 2,053 (74%) 
LAC food supply quantity (ton/capita/yr) 1.57 1.67 2.02 
population 284m 441m 611m 
LAC total domestic food supply  447 737 1,232 
Imports into LAC, tons (share of domestic 
supply net of exports) 
15 (3%) 42 (6%) 107 (9%) 
Exports from LAC, tons (share of domestic 
supply) 
48 (11%) 84 (11%) 271 (22%) 
Staples: cereals (% total) 99 (22%) 162 (22%) 230 (19%) 
Staples: roots & tubers (not potato) (% total) 38 (8%) 38 (5%) 65 (5%) 
61 
 
Non-staples (% in total) 
310 
(69%) 
536 (73%) 937 (76%) 
 1 
